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Sammendrag 
I denne artikkelen analyseres effekten på investeringer og andre makroøkonomiske hovedstørrelser som 
følge av lavere selskapsbeskatning i Norge. Vi bruker en utvidet versjon av den makroøkonomiske 
modellen NORA i analysen. Den utvidete modellen fanger opp tre kanaler som lavere selskapsskatt 
virker gjennom: for det første reduseres brukerprisen på kapital, noe som gjør investeringer mer 
lønnsomt. For det andre blir det mer lønnsomt å drive økonomisk aktivitet i Norge, slik at flere 
utenlandske selskaper flytter virksomheter hit. For det tredje bidrar reallokering av virksomheter til 
Norge også til økt eksport og økt aktivitet i andre norske virksomheter. Artikkelen bidrar til 
faglitteraturen ved å inkorporere de to siste kanalene i en helhetlig modellanalyse. Det er kun ved å 
inkludere alle de tre kanalene at modellen gjenskaper empirisk etablerte sammenhenger fra endret 
selskapsskatt til endrete investeringer på den ekstensive marginen og eksportøkninger.  
 
Vi finner at en reduksjon i selskapsskatten på ett prosentpoeng i Norge øker investeringer i Fastlands-
Norge med 0,6 prosent. Det meste av denne økningen kan tilskrives økningen i eksportetterspørsel som 
følge av økte direkteinvesteringer fra utlandet. Når vi derimot ser på tilfellet der selskapskatten reduseres 
både i Norge og i utlandet øker investeringene i Fastlands-Norge med kun 0,1 prosent, ettersom 
utenlandske virksomheter da ikke får et insentiv til å endre lokalisering.  
 
Vi analyserer også selvfinanseringsgraden ved en endring i selskapsskatten. Selvfinansieringsgraden 
viser hvor mye av den umiddelbare skatteletten som hentes inn på lang sikt på grunn av økt økonomisk 
aktivitet og økte skattebaser. Hvis vi skrur av reallokerings-effektene finner vi en selfinansieringsgrad 
på 57 prosent, som er noe lavere enn hva andre studier viser for en del europeiske land. Når vi derimot 
inkluderer effektene av at utenlandske virksomheter flytter til Norge og påvirkningen dette har på 
innenlansk eksport, øker selvfinansieringsgraden til 124 prosent.  Modellberegningene viser dermed et 
langsiktig proveny på 24 kroner når det gis 100 kroner i skattelette som følge av lavere selskapskatt.  
 
Vi bruker også den utvidete NORA modellen til å analysere den norske skattereformen fra 2014 til 2019, 
hvor blant annet selskapsskatten ble redusert fra 28 til 22 prosent. Ved å anta uendrete skatter i utlandet 
viser modellberegningene at den norske skattereformen bidrar til å løfte investeringer med rundt 3,5 
prosent og BNP Fastlands-Norge med 1,1 prosent på lang sikt. Selvfinansieringsgraden av reformen 
estimeres til rundt 135 prosent. Men, den norske skattereformen må sees i sammenheng med reduserte 
selskapskatter internasjonalt. Ved å skru av effektene som følger av reallokering og overskuddsflytting 
blir selfinansieringsgraden av den norske skattereformen 73 prosent og investeringene øker med 0,8 
prosent. Vi har ikke analysert velferdseffekter mer generelt eller hvordan skattereformen har påvirket 
graden av ulikhet i samfunnet.  
1 Introduction
The passthrough from corporate taxes to investment has been a core area of analysis in economics
for decades. A channel through which taxes affect investment behavior is their impact on the
user cost of capital, and thus the intensive margin of investment. During the last two decades,
there has been, however, increased academic interest in analyzing how corporate taxes impact
investment at the extensive margin through discrete location choices. This topic has also been
at the forefront of the political agenda, recently exemplified by the call, from US Secretary of the
Treasury Janet L. Yellen, for a minimum global corporate income tax to prevent U.S. companies
to relocate overseas (Yellen, 2021). The call can be seen as a reaction to the corporate tax reforms
undertaken by many countries over the last decades to inter alia make investment more attractive
to internationally mobile firms. As a result the average corporate tax rate in the OECD was
reduced from 32.3 % in 2000 to 23.5 % in 2020, see Figure 1.
In this paper, we identify how changes in the corporate tax rate impacts investments by extending
a DSGE model used for fiscal policy analysis in Norway (Aursland et al., 2020) to include
relocation effects. Our extended model captures three distinct channels for how a lowering of the
corporate income tax increases investment. First, it lowers the user cost of capital, so domestic
firms increase investment. Second, it increases the investments through the extensive margin,



































Figure 1: Corporate income tax rate in Nordic countries and OECD average. The graph
shows combined statutory corporate tax rates for period 2000 to 2020 obtained from OECD
Tax Database.
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as some foreign firms decide to relocate and invest in the country. In doing so we capture that
in contrast to the user cost channel, where the marginal return on investments is the relevant
decision-making margin, it is the average after-tax return on investments across different locations
that determines where firms decide to operate (Devereux and Griffith, 2003). Third, the inflow
of foreign direct investment (FDI) increase exports which spills over to domestic firms who then
increase their investment further. We refer to this latter channel as the FDI-export link.
We add to the literature by analysing both locations shifts and FDI-export link. To identify
locations shifts, we extend the model with a micro-founded block inspired by the model in
Becker and Fuest (2011) of optimal tax policy when firms are internationally mobile. To identify
the FDI-export link, we extend the model with a block inspired by the empirical specification
in O’Sullivan (1993) and the comprehensive evidence that the attraction of FDI has positive
spillover effects on export demand in the host country, see Popovici (2018) and Kastratović
(2020).
It is only when we incorporate both the FDI-export link and location shifts that we can account
for the empirically observed response of exports and extensive-margin investment to corporate
tax cuts, see e.g. Mooij and Ederveen (2008). We find that a one percentage point reduction in
the corporate tax rate in Norway increases investment by 0.6 %, most of which can be attributed
to the increase in export demand following the increase in foreign direct investment. In the
absence of the FDI-export link, fewer firms deem it profitable to relocate so the extensive margin
investments increase significantly less. Furthermore, the absence of the additional foreign export
demand weakens investment at the intensive margin leaving a total investment response of 0.1
%. When we alternatively assume that the tax rates in other countries decrease symmetrically so
there is no relocation, total investments increase by 0.1 %. Earlier models most closely related to
our study are Radulescu and Stimmelmayr (2010), Bettendorf et al. (2010), Coenen et al. (2012),
Bjertnæs (2018), Hanappi (2018) and Alvarez-Martínez et al. (2019). All these models capture
how a reduction in the corporate tax rate impacts the intensive margin through a reduction in
the required return on investment. Some of these models also capture the depreciation allowance
channel. In addition, Bettendorf et al. (2010), Bjertnæs (2018) and Alvarez-Martínez et al.
(2019) study the effect of profit shifting, the debt equity choice of firms and different options
for financing domestic investments for international investors. However, none of these studies
capture how international firms change location when average tax rates are reduced, nor do they
capture the FDI-export link.
Our article also relates to the literature studying the self-financing rate of corporate taxes.
Previous studies have found a self-financing degree ranging from 70 % to 90 % for some European
countries and the USA, see Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) and Strulik and Trimborn (2012). In line
with this literature, we find that when firm relocation in our model are switched off, the self-
financing rate is 57 %. However, we find a self-financing degree of 124 % when including these
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channels, meaning that government can save NOK 24 for every NOK 100, given as tax relief.
The largest self-financing contributions come from increases in various labor and consumption
tax bases.
Finally, we use the model to analyze the tax reform in Norway from 2014 to 2019, where, inter
alia, the corporate tax rate was gradually reduced from 28 % in 2013 to 22 % in 2019. The
Norwegian tax reform can be seen as a response to the international development of corporate
tax harmonization, see e.g. Pirvu (2012) and Keen and Konrad (2013). Moreover, Regis et al.
(2015) found that in Europe, tax convergence has taken the form of club convergence across
Central-Western European countries, including the Nordic countries, c.f. Figure 1.
We find that the Norwegian tax reform from 2014 to 2019 increases investment by about 3.5 % and
mainland GDP by about 1.1 % in the long-run, when assuming unchanged foreign tax rates. In
the labor market, the reform contributes to a 0.2 pp increase in the labor force participation rate
and a 0.2 % increase in the number employed. The self-financing rate is estimated to be around
135 % when firm relocation and profit shifting are included. However, since other countries have
made corresponding reductions in the corporate income tax, these estimates alone may paint an
overly rosy picture. The self-financing rate of the reform when firm relocation and profit shifting
are excluded, proxying a situation in which other countries lower tax rates symmetrically, is 73
%.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present our fiscal policy model, with
a focus on how FDI impacts exports and the intensive and extensive margins of firm behavior.
Section 3 provides information about the data used for aggregate real and tax depreciation rates
and the calibration of the parameters governing the location decision of firms. In Section 4,
the effects of a corporate tax cut are analyzed, and the relative importance of the user cost
channel, location decisions and the FDI-export link is decomposed. Section 5 applies the model
to Norway’s tax reform of 2014 to 2019. Section 6 provides a conclusion.
2 The model
In this section, we first describe the general characteristics of the original NORA model as
published in Aursland et al. (2020). The original NORA model serves as a basis for the novel
extensions, which are the main subject of this paper and which are laid out in detail in the
subsequent parts of this section.
6
2.1 Overview of the fiscal policy model NORA
NORA belongs to the class of DSGE models of small open economies and shares many elements
with prominent examples such as Monacelli (2005), Adolfson et al. (2007) and Justiniano and
Preston (2010). The model economy is assumed to have strong trade and financial linkages with
the rest of the world but is sufficiently small not to affect the world economy itself. Foreign vari-
ables are transmitted to the domestic economy through movements in the real exchange rate,
the yield on foreign bonds and the demand for exports.1
There are two types of households in the economy. First, an infinitely-lived utility-maximizing
(Ricardian) household earns labor income from employment in the private and public sectors as
well as capital income from interest and stocks. The household chooses how much to consume
and how much to save in the form of bank deposits and stocks. Second, the liquidity-constrained
household does not smooth consumption across periods and instead consumes its entire income
net of taxes each period.
The production side of the economy consists primarily of monopolistically-competitive firms
producing intermediate goods.2 Firms use labor and capital to produce an intermediate good
that is bundled with imported goods to make different types of final goods, including an export
good. The firms face a choice between paying out dividends to stock holders or investing in fixed
capital used in production.3 Investment is financed through both retained profits (equity) and
borrowing from banks (debt).4 Going beyond the original NORA model, we include a location
decision by firms based, among other things, on the rate of corporate profit taxes in possible firm
locations. This will be expanded upon in the next section.
A distinguishing feature of the Scandinavian countries is the role of wage formation; see e.g.
Barth et al. (2014). Consistent with the institutional framework for wage bargaining in Norway
(the so-called “frontfag” model), we assume that wage negotiations in the exposed sector of the
economy set the norm for wage growth in the rest of the economy.5 Specifically, we assume that
wages are set by Nash bargaining between a labor union aiming for a high level of wages and an
1Consistent with most analyses of the Norwegian economy, NORA focuses on developments in the mainland
economy, i.e. excluding the offshore oil sector.
2In NORA, firms are grouped into manufacturing and service sectors, where manufacturing sector firms are
more exposed to competition from abroad, both through imported goods and through their reliance on exports.
However, for the purpose of this paper, this distinction is irrelevant as we only investigate the aggregate investment
response in the economy.
3DSGE models often assume, for simplicity, that households invest in fixed capital that they subsequently rent
out to firms. Our more realistic depiction of the investment process allows us to describe the effect of tax changes
on investment more accurately. Note, also, that housing investment in NORA is exogenous and not affected by
corporate tax rates.
4We do not take account of the issuance of new equity, as underwriting commissions and other fees tend to
make issuance a more costly alternative than retained earnings or debt (Alstadsæter and Fjærli, 2009).
5An important purpose of this setup, which builds on the so-called main-course theory developed by Aukrust
(1977), is to preserve the competitiveness of the exposed sector and to ensure a high level of employment.
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employer organization aiming for high profits in the exposed sector. High unemployment, ceteris
paribus, is assumed to weaken the bargaining position of unions and lead to lower wage demands.
The result is a negative relationship between the real wage level and the unemployment rate,
often referred to as the “wage curve”; see Blanchflower and Oswald (2005). Labor force partic-
ipation is modeled in reduced form and responds to the after-tax wage and the unemployment
rate according to Dagsvik et al. (2013).
NORA includes a relatively disaggregated description of government spending and taxation. In
particular, households pay a flat tax on their total (ordinary) income, a surtax on labor income
and transfers as well as social security contributions. NORA holds also a detailed description of
the Norwegian system of shareholder income taxation, which represents an Allowance of Share-
holder Tax (ASE) system. This includes, inter alia, a rate-of-return allowance on stocks. The
deduction has the effect that the return up to the rate-of-return allowance is exempt from tax-
ation while only the remaining equity premium on stocks is taxed at the household level. This
leads to a neutrality of the household’s dividend tax with respect to investment decision.
Firms pay taxes on their profits net of deductions and social security contributions for their
workers. There is symmetry between the taxation of corporate income and household ordinary
income in the Norwegian tax code. Although the tax rates for corporate and household income
are equal in the baseline calibration, they are modelled as two distinct tax rates in NORA, which
allows us to isolate the impact of changing the corporate tax rate only.
The government also receives an exogenous stream of funding from the offshore sovereign wealth
fund, the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG). In 2020, the value of GPFG was around
3.5 times the value of GDP Mainland Norway. According to the fiscal policy rule, transfers from
GPFG to the central government budget shall, over time, follow the expected real return on the
fund, estimated to be around 3 per cent annually. A significant portion of government spending
in Norway is thus financed by withdrawals from the fund. Taxes and withdrawals from the GPFG
are used to finance government expenditures, which consist of unemployment benefits, purchases
of goods and services from the private sector, government employment, and public investment.
The central bank is assumed to follow a rule mimicking optimal monetary policy, subject to a
zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate.
The effect of a corporate tax cut in the extended version of NORA operates through three
main transmission channels. First, a tax cut increases the incentive to relocate through the
extensive margin. Second, the resulting inflow of foreign investment boosts exports through the
FDI-export link. Third, it lowers the user cost of capital, so domestic firms increase investment.
In the following, we outline these three channels in that order in detail.
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2.2 The location decision of firms
There is a continuum of firms in our model, of which a share decides to locate in Norway. The
location decision of an individual firm is made by comparing its potential after-tax value in and
outside Norway, a setup inspired by Becker and Fuest (2011).
The firm’s value if it decides to produce abroad (i.e. outside of Norway) depends on the taxation
of corporate profits abroad and on a fixed firm-specific mobility cost that firms need to pay
if producing there.6 These fixed costs are permanent to the firm and drawn randomly from a
uniform distribution. The value of the firm when locating abroad would principally also depend
on foreign cost of capital and wage costs. However, we keep those other determinants of the
value of foreign firms fixed in our analysis to focus solely on the effects of changes in Norways
tax system on relocation choices. In fact, for the sake of our analysis the value of a specific firm
when producing abroad is fixed since we keep all of its determinants constant.
However, the value of a firm when producing domestically, which will be modeled in much greater
detail and presented in section 2.4, changes for each firm when Norway changes its corporate
profit tax rate. By comparing a firm’s value abroad with its value in Norway we determine where
a firm decides to locate. We also obtain the critical value of fixed mobility costs. Firms with
that level of fixed costs are exactly indifferent with respect to their location choice. Firms with
fixed costs below that threshold decide to locate abroad while the remaining firms find it optimal
to produce in Norway.
Specifically, we assume the existence of a continuum of firms i ∈ [0, 2] capturing the entire
universe of firms that could potentially locate in Norway. A share nDt of these firms produces
in Norway at time t, the remaining share nFt = 2 − nDt produces abroad. In the initial steady
state we normalize nD to 1 such that initially half of all firms that are able to locate in Norway
do actually produce there.7 We assume that firms i ∈ [0, 1] are always owned by Norwegians,
with the rest of firms under foreign ownership, regardless of whether these firms move abroad
or to Norway.8 The firms decide on whether to manufacture in Norway or abroad. If and only
if they decide to manufacture abroad, they face fixed costs c(i), which are specific to the firm.
We assume that firms draw their (permanent) fixed mobility cost from a uniform distribution
[(1− b)a, (1 + b)a], where a is the center of the uniform distribution and b the (relative) spread.
6Note that these fixed mobility costs could be negative, implying a ceteris paribus benefit of producing abroad.
7Note that this assumption is motivated by numerical convenience rather than empirical fact, but involves no
loss of generality. Any initial steady-state allocation of firm location could be calibrated without changing our
results. The key calibration moment, as will be shown later, is the range of fixed mobility costs across firms.
8This assumption is a slight relaxation of the assumption in Becker and Fuest (2011), where all firms are owned
by domestic households. They show, however, that a symmetric setup with locals and foreigners holding shares
in both domestic and foreign firms do not change the result in any important way.
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Value of a firm located abroad To keep the model as parsimonious as possible we assume
two key simplifications for the foreign-located firm model: Foreign production does not employ
any labor and capital is entirely debt financed. As will be clear below, these simplifications have
no bearing for our results.
The production is given by Y Ft (i) = AF (KFt (i))αF , where AF is a parameter capturing produc-
tivity, KF is the capital stock and αF the capital elasticity. To produce abroad a firm needs to
rent the capital stock at the foreign real market interest rate, which is given by rFt . Dividends
(after-tax profits) in the foreign location are then given by
DIV Ft (i) = [Y
F
t (i)− c(i)− rFt KFt ](1− τFt ), (1)
where τFt the foreign corporate tax rate. The optimal capital stock for firms deciding to produce
abroad follows from profit maximization, taking into account the capital accumulation constraint,





+ δF , (2)
where δF is the depreciation rate of capital abroad. Hence, firms deciding to produce abroad will
increase their capital stock up the point when the marginal product of capital (left-hand side of
the equation) equals the marginal cost of capital abroad (right-hand side), given by the foreign
interest rate, tax rate and depreciation rate.9
To derive the net present value of dividends, and thus the value of the firm, we use the foreign









where RERt is the real exchange rate.10 Hence, we measure the value of the firm in Norwegian
currency. From the definition of profits it follows that the value of a foreign-located firm V Ft (i)
falls with its idiosyncratic mobility cost c(i). However, since fixed costs are constant for each
firm, as is the foreign interest and tax rate, the value of the firm when locating abroad is fixed.
This would also be the case if we modeled labor costs (assuming a constant wage) and an equity
financing decision.
9The corporate tax rate abroad, τFt , is calibrated such that it implicitly captures capital depreciation al-
lowances; see the calibration section. Thus, we do not explicitly model capital depreciation allowances, as opposed
to the case of domestic firms; see section 2.4.
10We assume that the foreign real interest rate is fixed. However, the results remain practically unchanged even
if we impose the movements of the Norwegian real interest rate on the interest rate abroad.
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The threshold fixed mobility cost We can identify the level of mobility costs at which firms




where Vt is the value of the firm if it decides to produce in Norway. This will be introduced later
on. In the case of equality, the value of the firm when locating abroad equals the value of the
firm when locating in Norway. If the interval [(1− b)a, (1 + b)a] is sufficiently large, then for any
value of Vt, there will be a mobility cost of indifference c̃t which solves equation 4.11
Solving for c̃t pins down the number of firms locating abroad (nFt ). This is because firms are
uniformly distributed across the range of possible fixed mobility costs [(1− b)a, (1 + b)a] and the
share of firms below and above the threshold can be easily calculated. Specifically, the number
of firms finding it optimal to locate abroad is given by nF = c̃t−(1−b)aba .
12 It is important to note
that the spread parameter b determines how sensitive the number of firms abroad is to changes
in c̃t. The larger b is, the smaller will be the number of firms deciding to relocate for a given
change in the threshold value (e.g. caused by a corporate tax cut), simply because the range
of possible fixed mobility costs becomes wider. We will exploit this property in calibrating the
parameter b; see section 3.
Since moving is itself a process that takes place with a considerable time lag in reality, we
consider a slowdown of the moving decisions expressed by
nFt = ρ
n c̃t − (1− b)a
ba
+ (1− ρn)nFt−1, (5)
where ρn is the speed at which firms actually make the move, given that they find it optimal to
move. For ρn = 1, all firms that find it optimal to move will do so instantaneously. For ρn < 1,
only a share of firms will move in time t; the others will follow in later periods. The choice of
this parameter allows us to square the model’s predictions of the evolution of foreign investment
following a corporate tax cut with empirical evidence discussed in the calibration section 3.
After a firm moves to Norway, it faces the same optimization problem as the pre-existing Nor-
wegian firms discussed in section 2.4. Part of the capital stock that is deemed optimal, given the
decision to produce in Norway, is built in Norway and forms part of the demand for domestic
investment goods in the relocation period, while the remaining part is imported. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume there are no costs associated with this capital transformation.
11We set the center of the interval, a, to the steady-state value of the threshold mobility cost, i.e. a = c̃ss,
thereby ensuring that in steady state the threshold mobility cost exactly halves the interval [(1 − b)a, (1 + b)a].
In this way, nD is set at 1 in the steady state as described above.
12To see this, consider the two extreme cases: When c̃ is at its lowest possible value, namely (1− b)a, zero firms
will locate abroad as none has a lower fixed cost than the threshold value. If on the other hand the threshold
value equals the maximum value of the interval, namely (1 + b)a, then all firms in i ∈ [0, 2] locate abroad.
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2.3 The FDI-export link
There is an extensive literature investigating the effect of foreign investment on export demand in
the host country. The general finding is that the former tends to generate increases in the latter
(Kastratović, 2020). Several pathways for such a causal relationship between foreign investments
and export demand have been identified, including the direct effect of establishing foreign affiliates
with the objective of exporting to markets outside the host country (export platforms), but also
indirect effects arising from the positive information externalities affecting host country firms
through the presence of foreign firms, imitation and demonstration effects, skill acquisition,
improvements in general infrastructure as well as increased competition; see e.g. Jones and Dei
(1983), Kojima et al. (1975) Aitken et al. (1997), Clerides et al. (1998), Greenaway et al. (2004)
and Tintelnot (2017).
We do not attempt to account for these transmission channels in our model, but include in our
model a reduced-form causal relationship between foreign investment (due to firms deciding to
locate in Norway) and export demand to proxy these transmission channels. As we will show,
only by including this proxy are we able to account for the empirically observed response of
intensive- and extensive-margin investment to corporate tax cuts. While we do not explicitly
target the elasticity of exports with respect to FDI, we verify that the outcome is consistent with
Norwegian historical data.
Specifically, and going beyond the setup of the original NORA model, we assume that demand
for exports is a function not only of prices for Norway’s export goods, the exchange rate and the
income of trading partners, but also of the number of firms producing in Norway. In our model,
export demand is thus given by:
Xt = (1 + ξX(n
D
t − 1))(P xt )−ηTP Y TPt , (6)
where P xt is the price of Norway’s exports expressed in foreign currency and Y TPt measures the
income of Norway’s trading partners. The parameter ηTP captures the elasticity of substitution
for Norwegian exports. Abstracting from the first term, this export demand function follows
from the optimal decisions of foreign export good purchasers and is standard in the literature.
However, in our model, this export demand is subject to a further term that captures how many
foreign firms relocate to Norway, with ξX governing the sensitivity of export demand to these
relocation decisions. The choice of functional form is inspired by empirical specifications linking
the amount of foreign investment to exports, found for example in O’Sullivan (1993).13 In the
initial calibration of the model, where nD = 1, export demand collapses to the standard formula.
As firms move to Norway and nD increases beyond unity, these firms generate additional export
13Note that taking the logarithms of both sides of equation 6 yields lnXt ≈ lnY TPt − ηTP lnPxt + ξX(nDt − 1),
which roughly corresponds to Equation 3 in O’Sullivan (1993).
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demand for goods produced in Norway. The larger the sensitivity parameter ξX , the larger the
increase in export demand following relocation. The parameter can be interpreted as measuring
how much more export-oriented relocating firms are than the average incumbent Norwegian
firm.14 Note, however, that we do not explicitly differentiate between the export demands that
incumbent and newly located firms face. Instead, there is an increase in aggregate export demand
from which all firms producing in Norway benefit equally.
2.4 The user cost channel
In the following, we introduce the problem faced by a firm i that decides to locate in Norway
and present its first order conditions. In modeling the financing decisions of such firms and
their tax bases, we add considerably more detail than for those that produce abroad, in order to
adequately determine the intensive margin response. The production function of firm i is given




where Yt(i) denotes the output of firm i, Kt(i), and Nt(i) are the capital and labor inputs in the
production process, and α is the output elasticity of capital. The demand faced by individual







Thus, each individual firm takes into account that the demand for its good Yt(i) depends on the






1−ε . The produced good
is combined with imports and the good from the second domestic sector to generate final goods.
The firm’s capital stock evolves according to the following capital accumulation equation
Kt+1(i) = It(i) + (1− δ)Kt(i), (8)
where It(i) denotes investment, and δ is the capital depreciation rate. Firms borrow money to
finance their operations by issuing bonds Bt. Nominal firm debt accumulates according to
PtBt(i) = PtBNt(i) + Pt−1Bt−1(i), (9)
where Pt is the nominal price in the economy, BN t(i) denotes the real value of new domestic
borrowing. We define the debt-to-capital ratio as bt(i) =
Bt(i)
λKt (i)Kt(i)
. Here λKt (i) is the shadow
14If ξX = 1, then export demand simply increases linearly with the number of firms in Norway. If ξX > 1, as
will be the case in our calibration, firms relocating to Norway tend to be more export-oriented than those already
in Norway. Conversely, firms that are more export-oriented tend to leave the country first in the case of corporate
tax hikes. Note that we have numerically checked that export demand cannot become negative for a realistic
calibration and tax shock size.
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price of capital as defined below. The cost of borrowing is given by (1 +Rt−1)RPBt−1(i)-1, where
RPBt (i) represents a risk premium, which comes on top of the nominal risk-free interest rate Rt
and which increases with borrowing, as captured by the firm’s debt-to-capital ratio. In particular,
we assume that
RPBt (i) = exp
ξB(bt(i)−βB), (10)
with ξB capturing the responsiveness of the risk premium to the debt-to-capital ratio and βB
representing a parameter calibrated to ensure that NORA matches the empirical debt-to-capital
ratio in Norwegian firms.15
The total before-tax profit is then given by
Πt(i) = P
Y
t (i)Yt(i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
sales
− (1 + τSSFt )WtNt(i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
labor costs
− ((1 +Rt−1)RPBt−1(i)− 1)
Bt−1(i)
πt︸ ︷︷ ︸
interest on dom. borrowing
, (11)
where Wt is the economy-wide wage rate, and τSSFt is the social security tax paid by firms.16
The corporate profit tax base is then given by
TBΠt = Πt − δτKτt − TD.
A depreciation allowance δτKτt is deductible from profits, where the tax depreciation rate is given








where πt = Pt/Pt−1 is the inflation rate and P It the relative price of the investment good. Thus,
in contrast to the capital accumulation equation (8), the tax cost basis of the capital stock (the
taxable capital stock) depreciates at a different rate and measures the accumulated nominal value
of investments, rather than the investment volume.18 The term TD captures an allowance for
corporate profits and is calibrated such that the tax base profits in steady state are in line with
data. Implicit in this definition of the tax base and in line with the Norwegian tax code is that
15The firm payments associated with the risk premium, i.e. the debt servicing costs in excess of the bank’s
lending rate, are assumed to be redistributed in a lump-sum fashion to the Ricardian household.
16Note that equation (11) represents profits after interest payments, which in accounting is typically referred
to as earnings before income taxes (EBT).
17Note that some models abstract from tracking the cost basis of capital stock for tax purposes and instead
apply the tax depreciation rate to the productive capital stock. If the tax depreciation rate is higher (lower) than
the economic depreciation rate, such an approximation would overestimate (underestimate) the value of future
depreciation allowances and bias the effect of the depreciation channel, which is discussed later.
18A more intuitive way of expressing the equation for cost basis of capital is Kτ,NOMt+1 = PtP
I
t It + (1 −
δτ )K
τ,NOM




t is the nominal cost-basis of capital stock for tax purposes. Thus, the
nominal value of the capital stock accumulates with the nominal value of investments. However, since the whole
model uses the CPI as its numeraire, we keep track only of the taxable capital stock deflated by the CPI. This,
however, has no bearing on our results.
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borrowing costs are considered to be a deductible expense for tax purposes while new investments
financed by equity are not (Sørensen, 2004, Södersten, 2020). The shareholder’s free cash flow is
then either retained to finance net investment, or used to pay dividends to shareholders or taxes
to the government. Hence, it holds that
Πt(i) = Π
R
t (i) +DIVt(i) + TB
Π
t (i)τt. (13)
where ΠRt (i) is the cash flow retained after paying out dividends and taxes. Investment is thus
financed by the retained cash and new borrowing, such that P It It(i) = ΠRt (i) + BN t(i). Thus,
a marginal investment is assumed to be partly debt- and partly equity-financed. As we show
further below, the share of each financing source is determined by firms’ profit maximization.











rt is the real market interest rate. The real market interest rate is a function of the household-
level after-tax interest rate on deposits, which reflects household’s discounting of future cash
flows, and ultimately depends on the risk-free interest rate set by the central bank, inflation, the








The real market interest rate is, however, not a function of the dividend tax rate. This is due
to an allowance for shareholder equity (ASE), which results in only the equity premium being
taxed and thus does not introduce any distortion with respect to investment decisions. While
this is not the focus of the present paper, we provide a short note on this neutrality result in the
appendix, Section F. A formal proof, which is also applicable to our framework, is provided in
Södersten (2020).
We assume that firms face three types of adjustment costs: price, investment, and borrowing
adjustment costs. These costs improve the empirical fit of the model and are calibrated in
the original NORA model to match the Norwegian business cycle moments. In the following
equilibrium conditions, we abstract from these adjustment costs. The technical appendix and
the simulation results do take these costs into account, however.
19See the appendix, Section F.
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The maximization problem of firms The decision variables of firm i are the amount of labor
it wants to employ Nt(i) given the wage rate in the economy, the price it wants to charge for the
good it produces PYt (i), the amount of investment It(i) it wants to undertake, and the amount of
new borrowing BNt(i) it needs to carry out that investment. The firm chooses the optimal value
of these variables in order to maximize its share price, taking into account constraints related
to how physical capital (see equation 8), taxable capital (see equation 12), and firm debt (see
equation 9) accumulates, and the need to satisfy the demand that materializes at the prevailing
price using the production technology in equation (7). We arrive at equations characterizing the
behavior of all firms that have decided to produce in Norway.
The first-order conditions for labor and prices are derived in detail in appendix C and are left
out here for brevity. In line with standard DSGE models, firms choose the amount of labor they
want to employ in such a way that the wage equals the marginal product of labor. The price of
output is set as a mark-up over the value of one unit of production, subject to price adjustment
costs.
The first-order condition on new borrowing, excluding adjustment costs, is given by λBt = −1,
where λBt is the Lagrange multiplier on new borrowing. Hence, a marginal unit of new borrowing
decreases the value of the firm by one unit. New borrowing, however, also allows the firm to
invest, which has positive effects on the value of the firm. Keeping the simplifying assumption of
no adjustment costs on new borrowing, the envelope condition for the level of debt Bt captures
this trade-off between the costs and benefits of borrowing:




t (1 + ξBbt)− 1. (14)
The right-hand side of equation (14) captures the marginal cost of borrowing. It depends on
the risk-free interest rate, the risk premium on firm borrowing RPBt , and the marginal increase
in the risk premium ξBbt caused by an increase in the debt-to-capital ratio; see equation (10).
Importantly, the term RPBt (1 + ξBbt) increases with the debt-to-capital-ratio bt. The left-hand
side of equation (14) captures the cost of equity financing.20
Two points should be mentioned about this result. First, the share of debt bt is a function of the
difference in the (required pre-tax) market return and the risk-free rate R. The lower the risk-free
rate relative to the cost of equity financing, the more firms will borrow to finance investment,
until the point at which the risk premium (increasing with debt) restores the balance between the
cost of borrowing and the cost of equity. Importantly, this implies that the marginal investment
is always financed by both debt and equity.21
20Note that the cost of equity-financing term, usually captured by r
1−τ , is expressed in nominal terms here as
also the right-hand side, the cost of debt, is given in nominal terms.
21Consider an investment project that is solely financed by retained earnings. This would lead to a fall in
the debt-to-capital-ratio bt as the capital stock increases, while debt levels remain constant. This in turn would
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Second, a change in the corporate tax rate directly impacts the balance between debt and equity.
Cutting the tax rate lowers the required return on equity and thereby reduces its cost as an
investment financing instrument. While the cost of debt financing is ex-ante independent of the
corporate tax rate, in general equilibrium the fall in equity financing costs necessitates a fall in
the cost of debt financing, which can only be achieved by a reduction in bt, and ultimately in
debt. Hence, a corporate tax cut shifts the burden of financing away from debt towards equity, to
an extent that depends on the elasticity of the debt risk premium to changes in bt. A consequence
of this shift is also a broadening of the tax base as interest costs, now reduced, are deductible
from the corporate profit tax base.22






= P It . (15)
Thus the shadow price of the real and taxable capital stock combined is equal to the price of
the investment good. In other words, the capital stock is expanded until the value added to
the firm by a marginal unit of capital, taking into account both the value increase through
higher productive capital but also a higher taxable capital stock (which generates depreciation
allowances), begins to fall below the price of investment. The equations for the shadow prices of
the two capital stock measures are given by
λKt (1 + rt) = λ
K











+ τt+1δτ . (17)
The shadow price of the capital stock at time t is given by its future shadow price adjusted for
physical depreciation and the value generated by the capital in the production process. Similarly,
the value of the taxable capital stock is given by its future shadow price adjusted for depreciation
at the tax-relevant rate plus the cash flow generated by the tax depreciation shield.
lower the cost of borrowing below the cost of equity and the firm would thus not minimize its cost of funding.
Conversely, an investment project solely financed by debt would bring the profit-maximizing condition (14) out of
balance by increasing the cost of borrowing beyond the cost of equity. Marginal investment is thus always going
to be financed partly by debt and partly by equity, thereby preserving the equality of the respective marginal
funding costs.
22Hypothetically, one could also construct a model in which marginal investment is financed by debt only, so
that a reduction in corporate taxes would not affect investment decisions. However, we have opted for the more
realistic option of allowing both financing channels to play a role, with the firm being able to choose optimally
between them.
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2.4.1 User cost of capital
Given the first-order condition for investment and the shadow prices for capital, we can derive























As shown in the appendix, in the optimal case the user cost of capital equals the marginal prod-
uct of the next period’s capital stock. An increase in the user cost of capital will thus imply
an increase in the optimal marginal product of capital. Due to the concavity of the production
function, this in turn necessitates a fall in the capital stock. Thus an increase in the user cost of
capital will induce firms to reduce investment, while a drop in the user cost will boost investment.
The user cost of capital consists of three components. The first component, which we call
the required return channel, relates to the condition that investments need to earn at least an
after-tax return equal to the real market interest rate r, otherwise these resources would be
invested elsewhere in the market. This implies that the pre-tax return, including compensation
for capital depreciation, needs to equal r1−τ + δ. A lowering of the corporate income tax rate,
τ , will lower the required pre-tax return, so that the user cost of capital falls. Such an effect
is consistent with models that assume retained earnings to be the marginal source of financing
(King, 1974). It is important to note, however, that the firms in our model make an endogenous
choice between retained earnings and financing through borrowing (recall equation 14) and thus
use a mix of both financing sources. Simultaneous use of two funding sources implies that the
two rates of return adjust according to equation (14). In contrast, in models with purely debt-
financed investment (Sandmo, 1974, see case with k = 0), the borrowing rate is independent
of the tax rate, so that this effect on the user cost of capital is absent. The required return
channel may also be independent of the tax rate in the case of tax systems that allow for a tax
deduction for the cost of equity, i.e. so-called Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) systems.
Norway, however, has introduced an Allowance for Shareholder Equity (ASE) tax system, which
instead grants an allowance for dividend and capital gains income at household level. While this
results in neutrality of the dividend tax rate with respect to the user cost of capital (see appendix
F), it does not neutralize the effect of the tax on corporate profit on investment decisions (see
appendix G). This is because the ASE system does not compensate for the additional pre-tax
return required by corporations to earn a given market return after paying taxes on corporate
profit. This additional required return prevents investment at the margin that would otherwise
have happened in the absence of the corporate profit tax, thereby distorting investment decisions.
In line with Sandmo (1974), the second component relating to the depreciation allowance adjusts
the required return when there is a wedge between the economic and tax depreciation rates. As
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the latter is applied to the nominal value of the taxable capital stock, it is divided by the in-
flation rate to make it comparable to the real economic depreciation rate δ. To understand the
importance of this wedge, let us first consider the case where it is absent, i.e. δ = δτ/πt+1. In
this case (and assuming that the taxable capital stock is equal to the physical capital stock),
the value of the tax depreciation allowance equals exactly the cost of depreciated capital, such
that effectively only the return after depreciation is subject to the corporate profit tax. The
corporate profit tax then does not affect the firm’s user cost of capital and thus investment
decisions beyond the required return channel. However, if the real depreciation rate is larger
than the tax depreciation rate, i.e. δ > δτ/πt+1, it is costly for the firm to hold capital from a
tax perspective since the tax then effectively also taxes depreciating capital. This is reflected by
the fact that this second term is then positive, increasing the user cost of capital relative to the
case of a neutral tax depreciation rate. If, on the other hand, the tax depreciation rate is larger
than the real depreciation rate, which is the case for Norway as we argue later, then the firm
has a tax benefit from holding capital and the user cost of capital is lower than in the neutral case.
Finally, the third component (not present in Sandmo’s contribution) captures the fact that a
potential wedge between the two depreciation rates implies that the physical capital stock and
the taxable capital stock depreciate at different speeds23. The neutral case for this term is given
when 1 − δ = (1 − δτ )/πt+1. Under this condition, and as is evident from comparing equation
(8) with (12), both capital stocks depreciate at identical rates and there is no effect on the user
cost of capital through this channel. However, when δτ is sufficiently larger than δ, so that
1 − δ > (1 − δτ )/πt+1 holds, this differential depreciation will tend to increase the user cost
of capital. This is because the taxable capital stock generates income to the firm through the
tax depreciation allowance (also captured by the fact that λK
τ
t > 0 as shown in the Appendix).
Hence, the faster this stock depreciates, the lower the present discounted value of tax depreci-
ation allowance, which implies a lower tax benefit from holding capital. This third term is of
course closely linked to the second, as both derive from the differential depreciation rates and can
best be viewed as dampening either the positive or the negative effect of the second term. The
joint effect of the two terms can be seen as roughly equivalent to an interest-free loan granted
by the tax authority to the company when tax depreciation exceeds economic depreciation, and
vice versa when economic depreciation exceeds tax depreciation, see Södersten (1982).
2.4.2 The passthrough of a corporate tax cut: theoretical predictions
In the following, we analytically determine the partial equilibrium elasticity of intensive-margin
investment with respect to a change in the corporate profit tax rate. To simplify the analysis, we
23In Sandmo (1974) it is assumed that capital markets are perfect in the extreme sense that capital goods can
be bought and sold in any amount at the same price and that adjustment costs are either insignificant or that
they are simply proportional to the amount of gross investment, so that these costs can be interpreted as included
in capital goods prices.
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consider only the long-run elasticity, and thus only steady-state effects. As derived in Appendix
D, we can then show that the long-run semi-elasticity of the user cost of capital with respect to









(r + 1)π − 1
(r + 1)π − 1 + δτ (1− τ)
> 0.







τ < 0. (19)
Thus this analytical expression allows us to determine the effect of investment on the intensive
margin given a corporate profit tax cut, subject to the following caveat: The expression is based
on a partial equilibrium view, as we ignore the effects of the corporate tax cut on labor inputs
and general equilibrium effects on firm demand due to changes in aggregate demand, most im-
portantly through changes in export demand caused by the relocation of firms. In our result
section, we will compare the implications of this formula on the intensive margin of investment
with the actual full simulation results in order to understand the general equilibrium effects on
the intensive margin.
Three important conclusions can be drawn from expression (19). First, the semi-elasticity of
intensive-margin investment (in absolute terms) increases with the market interest rate r. This
shows that investment is more strongly suppressed in a high-interest environment, implying par-
ticularly effective corporate tax cuts. Conversely, a low level of market interest rates reduces the
effectiveness of tax cuts at boosting investment. Second, the elasticity falls as the tax depre-
ciation rate rises. This is because at high values of the tax depreciation rate, the value of the
tax depreciation shield is relatively high. A reduction in tax rates will thus reduce not only the
required return, but also the value of the tax shield. The higher the tax depreciation rate, the
more important the latter effect. Third, at already high values of τ , a tax change has stronger
implications for the user cost of capital than at lower values of τ . As with the argument made
for r, this shows that investment is more strongly boosted when it was distorted more strongly
pre-reform.
Note that elasticity is always negative, since r ≥ 0, δτ ≥ 0 and τ ≤ 1.24 Hence, in contrast
to Sandmo (1974), our model suggests that a cut in the corporate profit tax rate will lower
the user cost of capital and increase intensive-margin investment independently of the difference
between the tax and economic depreciation rates. An important difference from Sandmo (1974)
is that we additionally take into account the faster depreciation of the taxable capital stock as
opposed to the physical one, see appendix E for more details.
24We assume that long-run inflation is positive, i.e. π > 1.
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3 Data and Calibration
We build on the calibrated version of NORA as published in Aursland et al. (2020).25 In this
section, we will only discuss the calibration of the new elements in this paper, including our
revised calibration of the interest rate, the values used for physical and tax depreciation rates
and the calibration of the parameters governing firm behavior.
3.1 Calibration of market returns
We base our calibration of the market return rates on previous studies by Norway’s central bank,
Norges Bank, and the Mork Commission. Norges Bank has recently estimated the neutral real
interest rate to be between 0 and 1 %; see Norges Bank (2018). The neutral real interest rate
is the real interest rate that is consistent with stable developments in commodity prices. Given
an inflation target of 2 %, the neutral nominal interest rate is then between 2 and 3 %. We
chose 2.5 %. In the model we calibrate the nominal interest rate by choosing the household’s
discount factor accordingly. Given a corporate bond risk premium of 1.5 % and an equity
premium of 3 %, the nominal corporate bond and nominal stock market return are set to 4
and 5.5 %, respectively. The magnitude of these premiums is taken from the assessment of the
Mork Commission, which was appointed to assess the equity share of the Government Pension
Fund Global; see NOU (2016). The equity premium is calibrated by assuming that households
holding stocks pay financial fees that increase the required return on stocks beyond the risk-free
return on bank deposits. Corporate bond returns are calibrated by choosing the sensitivity of
the corporate bond risk premium ξB accordingly, as the latter determines the size of the firm
risk premium and thus the wedge between interest rates paid by corporates relative to risk-free
interest rates.
3.2 The aggregate real and tax depreciation rates
Our macroeconomic model holds one aggregate capital asset. To calculate the aggregate real and
tax depreciation rates from microeconomic data, we follow the procedure outlined in Oulton and
Srinivasan (2003), where the aggregate depreciation rate is defined as the weighted average of
asset-specific depreciation rates, and where the weights are based on the nominal capital stock
for each capital object. We base our aggregate real depreciation rates on the findings in Barth
25NORA is calibrated to the Norwegian mainland economy at the quarterly frequency in a two-step procedure.
First, a subset of the parameters that determine the steady state of NORA are chosen such that the model’s
deterministic steady state replicates a number of long-run empirical moments, while the remaining steady-state
parameters are set either according to microeconomic evidence or by following related models. Second, we chose
values for the parameters, which only affect the dynamic behavior of the model, in order to obtain a good match
with VAR studies on the Norwegian business cycle.
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Table 1: Real and tax depreciation rates. Per cent. Annual rate. 2019
Weight Real depreciation Tax depreciation
Aggregate depreciation rates 10.3 14.8
Buildings 50.8 3.9 2.0
Transportation vehicles 11.8 15.9 22.0
Machinery 25.3 15.3 20.0
R&D, intangible assets, etc. 7.6 27.4 71.2
Boats and airplanes 4.5 9.8 13.0
Real depreciation rates are based on figures from the Norwegian National Accounts and Barth
et al. (2017). Tax depreciation rates are taken from https://www.skatteetaten.no/en/rates/
depreciation-rates/.
et al. (2017). They conducted a survey of Norwegian firms on their perception of the expected
economic service life of various fixed capital assets as well as their assessment of depreciation
profiles. Table 1 shows the real depreciation rates based on the results from this survey and the
rates that are currently used in the National Accounts. Table 1 also shows the corresponding tax
depreciation rates for 2020 as given by the Norwegian tax authorities for the following capital
types: buildings, transportation vehicles, machinery, R&D, intangible capital, etc., and boats
and airplanes. With the exception of buildings, the pattern seems to be that tax depreciation
rates are somewhat higher than real depreciation rates. For R&D, intangible capital etc., the
difference is high and reflects the fact that R&D can be expensed immediately according to
Norwegian tax laws. In aggregate, the real annual depreciation rate we use in the model is 10.3
percent, which is 4.5 percentage points lower than the aggregate tax depreciation rate of 14.8 %.
3.3 The calibration of firm behavior parameters
Table 2 lists the parameters governing firm behavior. We set the corporate profit tax rate abroad,
τF , as the average of effective average tax rates across OECD countries and 2018-2020 as provided
by OECD (2020).26 The rate of depreciation is set at the standard literature value of an annual
8%, which equals 2.06% per quarter. Analogously, we set the capital elasticity at 0.33 following
the literature convention.
Next in the table are the three remaining parameters that govern the behavior of domestic firms.
The value for the capital elasticity is set to match the empirical capital to output ratio in Norway,
while the elasticity of substitution across differentiated goods follows Norges Bank DSGE Model
Nemo, see Kravik and Mimir (2019). The risk premium parameter on firm borrowing is set to
match the corporate bond risk premium, as explained before.
26Note that this measure implicitly captures country-specific allowance rules for capital depreciation, so that
we refrain from explicitly modeling allowance rules abroad.
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Table 2: Parameters governing firms’ location decisions
Parameter Description Value
τF Corporate profit tax rate abroad 20.5%
δF Depreciation rate abroad (quart.) 2.06%
αF Capital elasticity abroad 0.33
α Capital elasticity at home 0.25
ε Elasticity of substitution across domestic output 6
ξB Risk premium parameter on firm borrowing 0.015
b Spread in fixed mobility costs 0.876
ξX Sensitivity of export demand 2.87
ρn Speed at which firms realize investment location 0.04
Not provided in the table is the foreign real market interest rate, rFt , which we set identical
to Norway’s real market interest rate. The productivity parameter AF is set such that the out-
put of firms abroad is similar in size to the output of firms in Norway. This assumption has no
bearing on the results but ensures smooth numerical convergence.27
The spread in fixed mobility costs governs the amount of firm relocation, while the sensitiv-
ity of export demand determines the extent to which the relocation stimulates exports. We
calibrate these two parameters jointly to match the extensive margin investment behavior us-
ing the international meta study by Mooij and Ederveen (2008), and the elasticity of exports
with respect to foreign direct investment based on the study for European countries by Popovici
(2018). Mooij and Ederveen (2008) find that the semi-elasticity of the number of foreign firms
with respect to the effective average tax rate (EATR) on corporate profits is -3.25. They obtain
the corresponding semi-elasticity of the tax base by multiplying the latter number by an esti-
mate of the share of internationally mobile capital (20 %), which yields a semi-elasticity of the
corporate tax base equal to -0.65 (=-3.25*0.2).28 Note that EATR differs from the statutory cor-
porate tax rate. Specifically, as defined in Devereux and Griffith (2003), we calculate the rate as
EATR = (PV ∗−PV )/PV ∗, where PV (PV ∗) is the present value of the next period’s dividend
payoff including (excluding) taxes. Through simulation, we find that when the corporate tax
rate in NORA decreases from 28 % to 27 %, the EATR decreases by 0.9 percentage point, from
27.0 % to 26.1 percent. Hence our target for the extensive margin effect on the corporate tax
base for a 1 percentage point cut in the statutory tax rate becomes ε̂extTB := 0.9×0.65 % = 0.585 %.
27AF only governs the scale of output of those firms that could potentially move to Norway, not of all firms in
the global economy. In contrast, the size of the total global economy is assumed to be considerably larger than
Norway’s, in line with our small open economy assumption.
28There is considerable uncertainty in both factors. Measured in terms of foreign direct investment relative to
overall investment, the share of internationally mobile capital in Norway is roughly 15 %, while based on foreign
ownership data, the share would come to well over 20 %. The Swedish Ministry of Finance has used an estimate
of 25 %. Choosing a middle way strategy, we follow Mooij and Ederveen (2008) and choose -0.65 as our target.
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Popovici (2018) gives an average estimate for the elasticity of exports with respect to the FDI in
European countries, ε̂FDIX = 0.2. Within the model, we calculate ε
FDI
X as the percentage change
in exports divided by the percentage change in FDI stock when the corporate tax rate is reduced
by one percentage point.
Our calibration strategy is as follows: We use the simplex optimization algorithm to find the
values which minimize the loss function (εextTB − ε̂extTB)2 + (εFDIX − ε̂FDIX )2, where εextTB is the sim-
ulated semi-elasticity of the extensive margin effect on the tax base with respect to the EATR,
and εint is the semi-elasticity of intensive margin investment with respect to the EMTR. The
corresponding variables with hats, introduced above, represent the empirical targets. The loss
function is minimized at b = 0.876 and ξX = 2.87.
Finally, we choose ρn = 0.04 so that firms’ moving decisions are initially slowed down, but
the number of relocated firms converges close to the long-run value no later than at 25 years.
This choice of dynamics is informed by empirical evidence (Wijeweera and Mounter, 2007, Wi-
jeweera and Clark, 2006), indicating that FDI responses to corporate tax reforms only become
significant after 1-4 years.29
4 Results
In this section, we discuss the simulation results for a 1 percentage point corporate tax cut. We
first analyze the channels whereby the effects of the tax cut feed through to investment and
other macroeconomic variables and then discuss the sensitivity of the results to various model
assumptions and calibration choices.
4.1 The transmission of a corporate tax cut to the macroeconomy
Effect on investment
In Figure 2 we show the response of investment and output (as % increase relative to the initial
steady state) to a permanent cut in the corporate profit tax rate from 28 % (the pre-reform
corporate tax level in Norway) to 27 %. We first focus on the benchmark model (blue, solid line),
which incorporates the firm relocation channel. The 1 percentage point cut in the tax rate causes
a long-run increase in investment of about 0.62 %. This occurs through three channels. First,
firms producing in Norway face a lower user cost of capital and ceteris paribus find it optimal to
29Given our calibration, about 15% of those firms that eventually move, do so within one year of a change in
corporate taxation.
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expand their capital stock, as predicted by intensive margin partial equilibrium results in 2.4.1.
Second, as the tax cut induces firms to locate to Norway, see below, incumbent firms face more
domestic competition, which is mitigated by the fact, that the foreign relocating firms stimulate
export demand also for incumbent firms, see sections 4.2 and 4.3 further below. These general
equilibrium effects also affect the intensive margin by shifting the demand that firms in Norway
face. Taken together, these effects are illustrated by the plot of the intensive margin, capturing
the change in investment per firm.30 Due to investment adjustment costs, the accumulation of the
now higher capital stock occurs slowly, with the new steady state being reached after around 15
years. Third, a number of firms originally producing abroad see an increase their after-tax profits
if they relocate to Norway, prompting them to move production. This is illustrated by the plot
of the extensive margin, which shows the increase in the number of domestically-producing firms
and the additional investment resulting from these relocations. When firms relocate, we assume
that a share of their capital is transferred from abroad, while the remaining share is produced
and installed in Norway.31 However, this process occurs slowly, as relocation is a sluggish process
(see equation 5). In the long-run, once the optimal capital stock has been reached, the extensive
margin is determined by the continuous investment of those newly relocated firms necessary to
sustain their capital stock.
Overall, the long-run increase in investment of 0.62 % is explained by about 0.03 % higher
investment per firm (intensive margin), and 0.59 % higher investment due to relocation (extensive
margin). The magnitude of the long-run response of the extensive margin follows from our
calibration strategy of matching Mooij and Ederveen (2008); see the calibration section 3.32
30Total investment is given by nDt It. We measure the intensive margin as the change in It (investment per firm
in Norway) and the extensive margin as the change in nDt (number of firms located in Norway).
31The details in this regard are not important for the results and only affect the initial response of foreign
investment. We assume that 20 % of the initial capital stock is produced using Norwegian resources, and the rest
is transferred or bought from abroad using the existing real capital or proceeds thereof.
32The long-run intensive margin response is considerably smaller than the partial equilibrium estimate in Mooij
and Ederveen (2008). One reason to that is that the after tax market interest rate depends on equity premium,
which in turn decreases with increasing corporate tax rate. That effect is relevant also in the absence of firm
relocation. Another important effect is that the foreign investment crowds out a significant part of the domestic
investment response. This intensive margin general equilibrium effect is elaborated further in section 4.2.
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Figure 2: Simulation results for a corporate tax cut by 1 pp. Per cent deviation from baseline
(initial steady state)
Further macroeconomic effects
We show the response of other main macroeconomic variables in Figure 3. In the benchmark
model, firms moving to Norway induce higher export demand from abroad (equation 6). This
leads to a long-run rise in exports of 0.6 %. This is qualitatively consistent with the empirical
literature that finds a positive effect on exports following foreign direct investment, as reviewed
in the meta study Kastratović (2020). This issue is discussed further in Section 4.3. Total output
in Norway, see figure 2, increases as investment and exports expand.
As the profitability of the manufacturing sector improves and employment increases due to the
investment boom, wage bargaining between the unions and the manufacturing sectors leads to
higher wages, which in turn pushes up domestic consumption. Consequently, the corporate profit
tax cut does not solely benefit the corporate shareholders. According to our estimates, 39% of
the total tax relief effect goes towards increased dividends for Norwegian or foreign corporations.
About half, 48%, goes to wage increases for the employed, and 13% goes to hiring unemployed
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Figure 3: Simulation results for a corporate tax cut by 1 pp. Per cent deviation from baseline
unless stated otherwise
persons or those who are initially outside the labor force.33 These results are broadly in line
with numerous studies that show that a significant portion of corporate tax is ultimately paid
by workers.34
In line with Wijeweera and Mounter (2007), the real exchange rate initially appreciates fol-
lowing the reduction in the corporate tax rate. This occurs because the Norwegian economy
initially attracts investment from abroad. Inflation initially slows down due to the appreciation
of the real exchange rate, but in the medium-run it increases as aggregate demand and wages
increase. Following a standard Taylor rule, the interest rate (not shown) increases in response
to rising inflation.
33The benefit to shareholders is measured as the long-run increase in total (domestic and foreign) dividends.
The benefit to the employed is calculated as the long-run aggregate increase in the wage bill among those who had
already been employed pre-reform. The benefit to the unemployed and those outside the labor force is calculated
as the change in their aggregate labor/transfer income. The total effect of the tax relief is then defined as the
sum of all three effects.
34The studies include Arulampalam et al. (2012), Felix (2007), Gravelle and Smetters (2006), Harberger (2008),
Hassett and Mathur (2006), Mutti and Grubert (1985), and Randolph (2006) see Table 13.15 in NOU (2014) for
an overview.
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Debt vs equity financing
In many tax systems, such as in Norway, debt is deductible from the corporate tax base while
the cost of equity is not. This favorable tax treatment of debt gives rise to an erosion of the
corporate tax base and a bias towards the use of debt financing, the magnitude of which increases
with the corporate tax rate. Our model is able to capture this distortion by keeping track of the
debt-to-capital ratio. A reduction in the corporate profit tax causes the cost of equity to fall.
Firms reduce their debt until the marginal cost of debt financing equals the marginal cost of
equity financing (recall the discussion below equation 14). For a 1 percentage point tax cut, we
find that the debt-to-capital ratio decreases by 0.3 percentage points, from the calibrated initial
steady-state value of 56.7 to 56.4 %. The strength of this effect is determined by equity and bond
risk premiums and the sensitivity of the bond risk premium to the debt-to-capital ratio, while
being independent of the relocation channel. Our estimated effect coincides with the typical
results in the empirical literature of about 0.3 percentage points; see e.g. Mooij and Ederveen
(2008).
4.2 The role of relocation decisions
Together with the benchmark model results, Figures 2 and 3 show the corporate tax cut trans-
mission in a model version in which firms are not able to relocate, and thus no firms move to
Norway in response to the tax cut (red, dotted line). The intensive margin response is about
0.14% in the long-run. This shows that in the benchmark model foreign investment crowds out
domestic investment through increased domestic competition more than the foreign investment
boosts domestic investment through the increase in export demand. Hence these general equi-
librium effects, competition and export spillovers, are on net negative for the intensive margin.
The extensive margin effect is completely absent by construction, such that the total investment
response is considerably smaller than in the benchmark model. As a consequence there is also no
positive spillover on exports as a result of FDI. The effect on GDP is thus also relatively weak
compared with the benchmark model, with an increase of 0.02 % compared with an increase of
0.17 % in the benchmark. By extension, the positive effects on employment, wages and con-
sumption are generally smaller in the alternative model.
Thus this model comparison demonstrates the inadequacy of a model without relocation de-
cisions for evaluating corporate tax reforms. Not only is such a model incapable of identifying
the extensive margin response of investment. Quantitatively important spillover effects onto
exports cannot be integrated into such a framework either. It is thus important to include re-
location decisions in order to more realistically estimate the effects of corporate tax cuts on
investment, GDP and employment.
28
4.3 The role of exports
In order to elucidate the link between exports and the investment response, we perform counter-
factual simulations with alternative assumptions about the export-intensity of relocating firms.
To do so, we vary the value of ξX , which determines how export-oriented those firms are. We
keep the distribution of fixed mobility costs at its benchmark.
The results of the counterfactual computations are shown in Table 3. The first column shows
the benchmark calibration. The second column shows the case when ξX = 0, in other words,
when the relocating firms do not create any additional export demand. Instead, the new firms
compete with incumbent firms into service the aggregate export demand Norway faces, which
results in a rather weak response in terms of investment and output. The intensive margin in-
vestment is crowded out by the foreign investment and decreases by 0.2 % in the long-run. Also
the extensive margin investment decreases. If we adjusted the sensitivity of location decisions
as to match again the extensive margin with Mooij and Ederveen (2008), the intensive margin
would be even more crowded-out.
In the third counterfactual shown in the last column of Table 3, we set ξX = 4.32, to match a
liner projection elasticity estimate (see supplementary Figure S5 for details). In this case, the
long-run investment response increases from 0.6 to 1.7%, with both the intensive and extensive
margin increasing.
It is evident that the parameter governing the export demand sensitivity with respect to firm re-
location (ξX) is key to the intensive as well as the extensive margin response of investment. Our
benchmark calibration, informed by the FDI-export elasticity found in Popovici (2018), yields in
total a relatively weak intensive margin response as the positive intensive margin response from
the lower user cost of capital is offset by the general equilibrium intensive margin effects arising
from more competition and export demand (which, as seen above, are net negative). However,
assuming a much higher export sensitivity would turn the general equilibrium effect positive,
implying a much stronger total intensive margin response.
Note that our model captures well the fact that the exported goods use imported goods as
inputs, so that imports also increase markedly (O’Sullivan, 1993). Due to the appreciation of the
exchange rate, imports increase more than exports in each of the counterfactuals. This weakens
the positive effect on the trade balance of the host country. That higher export demand increases
overall economic activity in the long run also depends on increased labour force participation. It
is the rise in real wages and lower unemployment that leads to the increase in labour supply, a
response which is consistent with the findings in Dagsvik et al. (2013).
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Table 3: Counterfactual assumptions of export-orientation of relocated firms.
Variable benchmark: ξX = 2.86 ξX = 0 ξX = 4.32
Elasticity of exports w.r.t FDI 0.20 −0.06 0.33
Investment, % change 0.62 0.10 1.67
Intensive margin 0.03 −0.20 0.49
Extensive margin 0.59 0.30 1.18
Mainland GDP, % change 0.17 0.02 0.48
Exports, % change 0.59 −0.09 1.94
Imports, % change 0.81 0.09 2.26
Trade balance (% of GDP) 0.12 −0.03 0.43
Numbers show the long-run change relative to the steady state following a 1 percentage point
reduction in corporate tax. Export elasticity with respect to FDI is calculated as % change in
exports divided by % change in extensive margin investment adjusted for the share of multina-
tionals (0.2).
4.4 Decomposing the total investment response
The previous sections allow us to quantitatively decompose the total investment response into
the three distinct channels through which corporate tax cuts affect investment: The user cost of
capital, the relocation of firms and the FDI-export link.
First, in a model without relocation and thus with only the user cost of capital channel present
(first row), investment only at the intensive margin increases, preventing the model from match-
ing the empirical evidence on the responses at both margins of investment.
Second, the model with relocation but without the FDI-export link leads to a positive extensive
margin response of investment (second row), in line with the empirical literature. However, the
general equilibrium effect of crowding out domestic investment through competition depresses
intensive margin investment considerably, implying counterfactually a strong decline in intensive
margin investment.
Third, by including also the final channel, the FDI export link (third row), and calibrating it
realistically to available empirical evidence, the crowding out of intensive margin investment is
mitigated by higher export demand from which also incumbent firms profit. The higher aggregate
demand also boosts the extensive margin to levels in line with Mooij and Ederveen (2008).
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Table 4: Summary of the investment responses
Intensive margin Extensive margin Total
No relocation 0.14 0.00 0.14
Relocation without FDI-export link −0.20 0.30 0.10
Benchmark model (relocation with FDI-export link) 0.03 0.59 0.62
Long-run impacts (as % deviation) for a 1 pp cut in the corporate tax rate
4.5 The role of the tax depreciation rate
To isolate the role of the tax depreciation rate in the investment response, we perform a counter-
factual to the benchmark corporate tax cut. In the counterfactual, we apply the corporate tax
cut only to the profit taxation rate while holding the tax depreciation shield rate at its steady-
state value. In analytical terms, this means that the tax burden of the firm in this counterfactual
is given by τtΠt − τssδτKτt . Figure 4 plots the result for the counterfactual simulation alongside
the benchmark case.
As discussed in the previous section, we observe that a tax cut increases investment through
the intensive margin and the firm relocation channel. This is because investment projects at
the margin, which were deemed unprofitable pre-reform, now become worthwhile, as the tax
cut lowers the pre-tax return that investors demand to break even. Similarly, lower taxation of
profits makes it more attractive for foreign-located firms to produce in Norway, triggering relo-
cation movements and boosting extensive margin investments. This channel is active both in the
benchmark and in the counterfactual, as in both cases the tax rate on corporate profits is lowered.
However, in the case of the benchmark model, the tax cut also reduces the net present value
of the depreciation shield, given by the product of the corporate tax rate and the depreciated
capital. Hence, while the corporate tax cut lowers the required return component of the user
cost of capital, it increases the user cost of capital component related to the depreciation shield,
see section 2.4.1. This is also relevant for the relocation decisions of firms as, ceteris paribus,
the loss in the depreciation shield deters firms from moving to Norway. As a consequence, if the
depreciation shield effect is switched off as in the counterfactual (red, dotted line), the investment
response is considerably larger, at both the intensive and the extensive margin.
Hence, model-based evaluations of corporate tax reforms that only include the required return
channel will overestimate the effectiveness of corporate tax cuts in stimulating investments at
the intensive margin, as the negative contribution by the depreciation channel is ignored.
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Figure 4: Effect of a corporate tax rate in the benchmark model compared to when the tax
depreciation shield is unchanged. Per cent deviation from baseline
4.6 Self-financing effects
Fiscal authorities also care about the budgetary cost of a tax cut. Our model allows us to
disentangle the various contributions to the self-financing of the tax cut from the main income
and revenue items of the government budget. Table 5 shows how these items contribute to the
funding of a one percentage point reduction in corporate profit tax. The three columns represent
alternative model assumptions. Columns 1 and 2 show the benchmark and the model in which
firms cannot relocate. Column 3 shows the benchmark model in which we additionally assume
a reduced-form profit-shifting effect caused by the corporate tax cut.35
We base our profit-shifting effect on estimates as reported in SOU (2014) and NOU (2014), who
assume an increase of 0.4 % in the tax base due to profit-shifting by multinational corporations in
response to a 1 percentage point corporate tax cut.36 The numbers in the table are percentages,
35Profit shifting is modelled as an increase in the corporate tax base which does not affect the economic behavior
of the firm. Specifically, the corporate tax base is then written as TBΠ,Mt = (Π
M
t − δτP It KMt −TDOIF )γt where
factor γt depends linearly on the corporate tax rate such that the targeted profit-shifting elasticity is achieved.
36The estimate is obtained by multiplying the semi-elasticity of the profits of multinational corporations, which
is 0.8 according to the recent study Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017), by the presumed share of multinational
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with 100% corresponding to the size of the ex-ante fiscal impulse, i.e. the steady-state corporate
tax base multiplied by 0.01. Income and expenditure components adjust to the new steady state
and provide potential additional sources of financing, such that the residual amount that needs
to be covered by oil fund withdrawals is less than 100% of the ex-ante fiscal impulse.37
In the benchmark case with firm relocation, there is large amount of self-financing coming from
a number of tax bases (see the income components in Table 5). The largest self-financing con-
tributions are attributable to the consumption tax base as well as the increase in various labour
tax bases. The latter expand mostly for the reason of higher wages (as the larger capital stock
renders labor more productive) and only modestly due to higher extensive-margin employment,
see also Figure 3, while hours per employed are fixed in the long-run by construction. The corpo-
rate tax base also increases and contributes significantly to financing the tax cut. In the model
without relocation (middle column) the tax bases increase generally less. The main reason is
that in the absence of the additional export demand generated by the relocated firms, the effects
on employment and wages are considerably smaller, and hence the labor and consumption tax
bases will not increase by as much.
In the model that includes relocation and profit-shifting (far right column), the effects on tax
bases are otherwise identical to the benchmark case, but there is an additional increase in the
corporate tax base due to profit shifting.
Table 5 also shows the financing effects from the expenditure side. The effects on government
purchases, investment, unemployment benefits, and debt service are relatively small.38 However,
the hike in wages following the corporate tax rate cut significantly increases the government wage
bill. This in itself tends to make the tax cut more expensive than its ex-ante cost.
The last two rows of Table 5 summarize how the government budget is balanced by transfers with
the oil fund. In the base line model with foreign investment, the self-financing degree is 124 %,
meaning that government can save NOK 24 to the oil fund for every NOK 100 given in tax relief.
The inclusion of the profit-shifting effect improves the self-financing rate to 134%. Self-financing
excluding foreign investment amounts to 57%, meaning that the government has to draw on the
oil fund to finance the tax cut.39 Hence, modeling the extensive-margin response of investment
to corporate tax cuts has important implications not only for the aggregate investment response
but also for government budget effects. Taking into account the effects of attracting foreign
investment as well as profit-shifting renders the corporate tax reform highly self-financing as
opposed to in the model in which the economy is closed to foreign investment.
corporations in the tax base, 50%.
37See appendix H in the Annex for further discussion about the government budget constraint and the role of
the oil fund in our model.
38These follow from small changes in prices, the interest rate and the unemployment level.
39The obtained self-financing degrees also depend on the assumptions on how government finances the deficit
or spends the surplus. If we assume adjustments in transfers instead of oil-financing, the total self-financing rate
in the absence of firm relocation becomes only 30%.
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For comparison, the smaller models by Sørensen (2014) and Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) predict
38.5 % and 79 % total self-financing degree for capital taxes, respectively.40 As a part of their
analysis, the Norwegian expert group NOU (2014) applies the simple framework in Sørensen
(2014) with parameters attuned to Norway, and find total self-financing degree of 27.8 %, most
of which (14.9 %) are attributed to increase in labor income. Capital taxes contribute 6.4 %,
savings 3.7 %, and consumption taxes 2.9 %. These numbers are low compared to both the
benchmark model and the model without relocation. However, our model cannot be directly
compared to Sørensen (2014), because the study excludes relocation decisions, social security
taxes, dividend tax, and details of the public sector. His calculation also assumes that the
tax decrease is financed by decreasing government consumption, while our tax cut is essentially
unfinanced.
The Norwegian expert group on the tax reform proposal NOU (2014) further analyses the self-
financing effect in the corporate tax base itself.41 They split the self-financing portion of the
corporate tax base (only) into parts that reflect the effects on intensive margin investment,
extensive margin investment, the change in debt vs equity discrimination, and on profit-shifting.
NOU (2014) refers to a tax cut from 27 % to 20 %, so our numbers reported in this paragraph
correspond to long-run estimates from a separate simulation in which we also adjust (only) the
corporate tax by 7 percentage points. The report estimates a self-financing contribution from an
increase in investment at the intensive margin of 3-5 % while we obtain -1.7. %. The difference
can be attributed to the crowding-out of domestic investment by foreign investment. According
to NOU (2014) the extensive margin investment contributes 11-15 %, while our result is 12.4
%. For the debt vs equity discrimination channel, they estimate 3 % of self-financing while
our result is 1.4 %. Our smaller effect is partly because the equity premium increases with
decreasing corporate tax rate. Both we and the report find an 8 % contribution to self-financing
from profit-shifting, as we use the same calibration strategy. Finally, note that when we assume
that other countries follow suit and firms have neither an incentive to shift profit or location, the
self-financing effects from the extensive margin investment and profit-shifting amount to zero.
In this case, there is no crowding-out of intensive margin investment, so we obtain a positive
self-financing contribution of 0.5 %, which is still smaller than the estimate reported by NOU
(2014). The self-financing contribution from the shift from debt to equity financing, is 1.3 % and
thus roughly the same as in the benchmark model.
Overall, our estimates on the self-financing contribution through the corporate tax base channel
is somewhat lower than estimated by NOU (2014). However, the expansion of other tax bases
caused by general equilibrium effects contribute strongly to self-financing, see the discussion
40In these models, business taxation is proxied through a capital tax (only), which applies to the capital stock
of the firm. Sørensen (2014) states that a rise in the effective capital tax rate could be implemented by a rise in
corporate income tax or broadening of the respective tax base.
41The expert group based their analysis on the estimates provided in Mooij and Ederveen (2008) and Heckemeyer
and Overesch (2017).
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Table 5: Financing contributions from each item in the government budget
Benchmark No relocation Profit shifting
Ex-ante fiscal impulse 100 100 100
Income components 198 69 209
Corporate profit tax 16 2 27
Consumption tax 52 20 52
Ordinary income tax 74 38 74
of which labor income 56 9 56
of which interest income 2 1 2
of which dividend income 15 28 15
Labor surtax 17 3 17
Household social security contributions 4 1 4
Firm social security contributions 36 6 36
Expenditure components -75 -12 -75
Government purchases and investment -5 -1 -5
Government employment -68 -11 -68
Unemployment benefits 0 0 0
Government debt servicing -2 0 -2
Oil fund withdrawals -24 43 -35
Self-financing rate 124 57 135
Following Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), the financing contribution for budget items Z other than cor-
porate tax revenue is calculated as ±∆Z/(TBOIFSS ∆τOIF ), where a plus sign applies to expenditure
items and a minus sign applies to tax items. The self-financing contribution from the corporate tax
base is calculated as 1 + ∆T/(TBOIFSS ∆τOIF ), where TBOIFSS is the corporate tax base (taxable income)
and ∆τOIF is the change in the corporate profit tax rate (1 pp). Benchmark = model with foreign
investment and without profit shifting. No relocation = model without foreign investment and without
profit shifting. Profit shifting = model with foreign investment and with profit shifting.
earlier, leading to an overall high self-financing degree of the corporate tax cut.
Figure 5a shows Laffer curves for the corporate tax rate. We follow Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)
in that the Laffer curve shows total tax revenue and so does not include the effects from the
expenditure side of the government budget. In the absence of firm relocation (dashed red line
in Figure 5a), we obtain a Laffer curve with the traditional hump-shape of the literature. In
contrast, in the benchmark model with foreign investment (solid blue line in Figure 5a), the
Laffer curve is initially downward sloping. The hump-shape is now absent because tax revenue
is maximized at a negative corporate tax rate of -18 %. Hence, we replicate the traditional
hump-shaped Laffer curve only when assuming away firm mobility. This can alternatively be
interpreted as a situation in which the corporate tax rate is adjusted simultaneously and equally
in all countries so that firms have no tax-based incentives to relocate.
The Laffer curve only measures tax revenue, so it does not take into account the fact that the
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(a) Laffer curve








































(b) Fiscal gap as measured by oil fund withdrawals

































Figure 5: Government revenue-maximizing tax rate. The graphs shown are normalized such that
the level at 28% corporate tax rate corresponds to 100.
government expenditures increase. The full effect on government finances is better captured by
figure 5b, which shows how the budget balancing oil-fund withdrawals, i.e. the fiscal gap, depend
on the corporate tax rate. By looking at the balancing item, we can identify the corporate tax
rate which requires the least amount of balancing (as measured by the negative of the fiscal gap).
In the benchmark model, the fiscal gap initially decreases when we move towards the left from
the initial 28% tax rate, and the fiscal gap is minimized at a tax rate of 15 %. This is in contrast
to the model without firm mobility, where the fiscal gap increases with a decreasing corporate
tax rate.
Our analysis thus shows that the shape of the Laffer curve hinges decisively on assumptions
about international developments in corporate profit taxation. Only when we assume that other
countries follow suit in lowering corporate tax rates can we confirm the finding of a hump-shaped
Laffer curve peaking at levels substantially above 50%. However, when the reform is undertaken
as a unilateral national action, the Laffer curve peak is obtained at much lower levels of the
corporate tax rate. If policy makers want to avoid a race to the bottom for corporate taxes,
these results point towards the importance of international coordination in setting the tax levels.
5 Application: Norway’s tax reform of 2014-2019
In this section, we evaluate the Norwegian corporate tax reform using the framework developed
in the preceding sections. We first provide an overview of the reform, which encompassed not
only changes in the corporate tax rate but also in the way personal income is taxed. Then we
evaluate the different components and overall effects of the tax reform by observing how the tax
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changes affect the economy in the mainland Norway.
Overview of the Norwegian tax reform
Prior to the 2014–2019 tax reform, the ordinary income tax rate for both firms and households
in Norway was 28 percent, the level set in the 1992 tax reform.42 Personal income tax had a
progressive structure achieved through a two-step surtax on employment income. Between 1992
and 2006, had a substantial incentive to shift labor income into capital income Alstadsæter and
Fjærli (2009). The 2006 tax reform reduced the labor surtax from 19.5 % to 9 % and introduced
the shareholder model for personal ownership, according to which the equity premium on capital
gains and dividends is taxable as ordinary income while the risk-free return is tax-exempt.43
This special tax system, referred to as the ASE model (allowance for shareholder equity), has
the advantage that investments and optimal debt ratios are neutral with respect to the level of
the dividend tax.44 Note that the ASE system is different from the ACE tax system implemented
in some countries in which the cost of equity is deductible at corporate level.
In anticipation of the broader tax reform, the corporate tax rate was reduced to 27% from
beginning of 2014. The following year, after a recommendation by a government-appointed
expert committee (NOU, 2014), the Solberg I government decided to decrease the corporate tax
on profits gradually to 22% over the period 2016-2019 (Finansdepartementet, 2015). To avoid
the re-emergence of incentives for profit shifting between labor and dividend income, personal
income tax was reduced symmetrically, while both the tax on dividends and the labor surtax
were increased. Furthermore, tax rate adjustments were made to equalize the total marginal tax
rates for the dividend income and labor income to neutralize related profit-shifting incentives.
The financing of the tax cuts included various other tax adjustments, the most important being
an increase in the labor surtax, neutralization of the tax effect on petroleum and hydropower
industries,45 a new tax on the financial industry, and the elimination of some deductions.
In summary, the main changes in taxation that we will consider are:
• Corporate tax
– A decrease in the statutory tax rate from 28 % to 22 %, which corresponds to a
42Before the 1992 tax reform, the corporate tax rate was 50.8% and the top marginal rate on employment
income was 57.8%.
43See Alstadsæter and Fjærli (2009) for a detailed discussion of the Norwegian dividend tax system before and
after the reform.
44The ASE tax system is modelled in detail in the NORA model. As a consequence, dividend taxes are neutral
in the model, so that financing of government spending by means of lump-sum taxes or by dividend taxes amounts
to the same.
45Taxes on immobile natural resources were adjusted gradually over the period 2016–2019 from 51 % for
petroleum and 31 % for hydropower to 56 and 37 percent, respectively.
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decrease in the effective corporate profit tax rate46 from 28% to 22.5%;
• Personal income tax
– A decrease in the statutory ordinary personal income tax rate from 28 % to 22 %
which corresponds to a decrease in the effective ordinary income tax rate from 23.8 %
to 19.3 %;
– The introduction of a scale-up factor for dividend tax (1.44 in 2019) consistent with
an increase in dividend tax from 28 to 31.68 %;47
– The tax surcharges in the (now four) income brackets were increased gradually from
[0 %, 0 %, 9 %, 12 %] in 2015 to [1.9 %, 4.2 %, 13.2 %, 16.2 %] in 2019, which
corresponds to a 2.3 pp increase in the effective surtax tax rate.
– A 0.4 pp increase in the effective household’s social security contribution rate.
In the following, we discuss the effects of different components of the 2014-2019 tax reform on
activity in mainland Norway. We define the 2014-2019 tax reform as a combination of the tax
changes listed above. As the main focus of this article is on corporate taxes, we refer the reader
interested in the theory behind the pass-through of the personal income taxation in NORA
model to Aursland et al. (2019). Thanks to the high self-financing degree of the corporate tax
cuts, the overall reform proves to lead to a budget surplus. We assume that this surplus is
absorbed by less withdrawals from the oil fund (GPFG), which households do not internalize
as their own wealth. Consequently there are no additional income effects on households beyond
the aforementioned tax changes. It is important to note that when we isolate the effect of the
tax changes in Norway, we assume the international tax rates to remain unchanged. Since there
actually was a coincident decline in foreign tax rates, the assessed impact should not be seen as
a forecast for the Norwegian economy but rather as a quantification of the isolated effects, which
could be useful for cost-benefit analysis.
Effect on investment and activity in mainland Norway
At first it is important to point out that according to our analysis, the reduction in the corporate
tax rate dominates the reform, while the other tax adjustments alter the picture in a very
modest way. This can be seen in Figure 6, which shows the response of investment and output
(as % increase relative to the initial steady state) to the broader reform and to a stand-alone
reduction in corporate tax from 28 % to 22 %. In the long-run, investment increases by 3.3 %
in response to the stand-alone corporate tax cut and 3.5 % in response to the broader reform.
46Not to be confused with the EMTR or EATR, the effective tax rate is defined as taxes paid divided by taxable
income. Effective tax rates are available in Statistics Norway’s Survey of Tax Assessment, Table 08564.
47We define the dividend tax rate as the ordinary income tax rate multiplied by the scale up factor.
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The corresponding increases in intensive margin investment are 0.2 and 0.1%, and in extensive
margin investment 3.2 and 3.3 %, respectively. The long-run effects on mainland output are 0.9
and 1.1 %, respectively.
Hence, the effect of the broader reform is almost equivalent to the effect of the reduction in
corporate profit tax alone. On the one hand, this can be attributed to the neutrality of the
dividend tax in the ASE tax system (see appendix F) and to the fact that the increase in
dividend tax has only a small negative effect on income. On the other hand, there is little
change in labor taxation at aggregate level, as ordinary income tax on labor falls while labor
surtax increases. Overall, there is a small net decrease in labor taxes, which increases labor
force participation (not shown in the figure), employment, and wages. This leads to a positive
income effect that more than offsets the negative income effect due to the increased dividend
taxation. Moreover, the higher employment increases the marginal productivity of capital and
further stimulates intensive margin investment; see more details in supplement B.
Table 6 summarizes the effects of the 2014-2019 tax reform by reporting the changes in selected
variables five years after the first year of the reform (beginning of 2019), after ten years (begin-
ning of 2024), or at the long-run steady state, which is realized after around 25 years. As well
as the variables contained in the figures, the table shows that the user cost of capital decreases
by 0.1 %. The firms debt-to-capital ratio decreases by 0.3 percentage points, which contributes
to an increasing tax base as discussed in section 4.1. Changes in the labor market are realized
gradually. Within the first five years, labor force participation increases by 0.25 % and in the
long-run by 0.36 %. Employment eventually increases by 0.7 % and the unemployment rate
decreases by -0.2 percentage points. Pre-tax wages increase more gradually and eventually by
2.5 %. Thanks to the increase in the wage bill and in employment, the household consumption
increases gradually, and finally by 3.3 %. Interest rate and inflation react very little, and are
mostly driven by the real exchange rate, which appreciates by almost 4 % in the long-term.48
The last row in Table 6 shows that the fiscal impulse (defined as the change in the government
budget balance) changes its sign over time and that after 10 years the tax reform reduces the
size of the deficit by 0.3 % of GDP.
The forth column in Table 6 shows the long-run response if the tax reduction in Norway causes
foreign countries to cut their taxes, so that firms have no incentive to relocate. In this case,
investment increases only through the partial equilibrium intensive margin channel. The overall
increase in investment and output is reduced to 0.8 %. Increases in consumption, labor force
participation, employment, and wages are also smaller.
Note that if foreign countries reduced their taxes and Norway did not, there would be a negative
impact on the Norwegian economy. To this end, the far right column in Table 6 illustrates
48The assumed Taylor rule depends on the real exchange rate, see Aursland et al. (2019) for details.
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Figure 6: Response of investment and GDP to the Norwegian tax reform. Per cent deviation
from baseline. Time period 0 corresponds to 2013Q4.
the effect on Norwegian mainland economy of a one percentage point reduction in the foreign
corporate tax rates. The mainland output, investments, and consumption decline, and the
employment decreases. Also the government finances are impacted negatively. In this sense,
the Norwegian tax reform can be seen as partly countering the fleeing of the tax bases through
international competition and partly correcting incentives in domestic taxation.
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Table 6: Effects of the 2014-2019 tax reform. Change in percentage points (unless stated other-
wise) relative to a no-reform reference.
Variable 5 years 10 years Long-run No relocation Foreign tax cut
Mainland GDP, % change 0.75 0.90 1.09 0.27 −0.15
Investment, % change 2.59 2.24 3.48 0.82 −0.48
Intensive margin 0.35 −0.57 0.22 0.82 0.10
Extensive margin 2.24 2.81 3.26 0.00 −0.58
User cost of capital, % change −0.08 −0.05 −0.07 −0.18 −0.03
Debt-to-capital ratio −0.33 −0.30 −0.31 −0.35 −0.01
Consumption, % change 1.71 2.34 3.28 1.33 −0.35
Labor force participation 0.25 0.31 0.36 0.15 −0.04
Employment, % change 0.53 0.60 0.66 0.24 −0.08
Unemployment rate −0.18 −0.17 −0.15 −0.02 0.02
Pre-tax wages, % change 1.02 1.72 2.52 0.31 −0.40
Interest rate (pp, annual.) −0.15 0.07 0.00 −0.13 −0.02
Inflation rate (pp, annual.) −0.01 0.16 0.11 0.01 −0.02
Trade balance (% of GDP) 0.33 0.60 0.65 −0.26 −0.17
Real exchange rate, % change −1.84 −2.57 −3.50 −0.35 0.56
Fiscal impulse (% of GDP change) −0.12 0.02 −0.26 0.20 0.08
The interest and inflation rates are given in annualized terms. The trade balance is expressed as a percentage
of mainland GDP. A negative change in the real exchange rate corresponds to an appreciation of the Norwegian
krone. The fiscal impulse is expressed as % of mainland GDP and corresponds to the amount withdrawn from
the oil fund that balances the budget. The foreign tax cut scenario shows the impact from a one percentage
point reduction in the foreign corporate tax rates. The time horizon is calculated from the beginning of the tax
reform, so the 5-year column refers to the beginning of year 2019, while 10 years refers to the beginning of 2024.
Financing the 2014-2019 tax reform
In analogy with 4.6, we can calculate a degree of self-financing for the reform package.49 The
self-financing rate is given by a ratio of two terms, where the numerator is the ex-post change
in budget surplus caused by the reform package minus its ex-ante change and the denominator
is the ex-ante change in budget surplus. The self-financing rate of the full reform amounts to
135 %. In other words, for every NOK 100 spent on tax cuts, the government eventually reduces
government spending by NOK 35. The reform not only finances itself, it generates excess tax
revenue. As discussed previously, this high degree of self-financing only occurs provided that
other countries do not simultaneously lower their corporate tax rates. If we assume that they
act in such a way that firms find it neither beneficial to move to Norway nor to leave it (which
means profit-shifting would also have no effect), the self-financing rate shrinks to 73 %.50 We
refrain from discussing the effects of the full reform on the government budget in more detail, as
the effects are quantitatively very similar to those analyzed above in section 4.6. The interested
reader is instead referred to our supplementary table S1, which provides detailed tabulation of
financing effects.
49This is possible as long as the ex-ante change in tax revenue is different from zero
50Note that financing the deficit with transfers or taxes instead of withdrawals from the oil fund as assumed
here would have a negative self-financing effect.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied how lower corporate tax rates impact investment by extending
a DSGE model used for fiscal policy analysis in Norway. Our extended model captures three
distinct channels for how a lowering of the corporate income tax increases investment. First, it
lowers the user cost of capital, so domestic firms increase investment. Second, it increases the
incentive to relocate through the extensive margin, so foreign firms relocate and invest in the
country. Third, the inflow of FDI increase exports which spills over to domestic firms who then
increase their investment further. We referred to the latter channel as the FDI-export link.
Our contribution to the literature has been to analyse the importance of both location shifts and
the FDI-export link. We found that a one percentage point reduction in the corporate tax rate
increases investment by 0.6 %, most of which can be attributed to the FDI-export link.
From the government’s perspective, the relocation channel as well as the FDI-export spillover
channel makes corporate tax cuts self-financed and the Laffer curve downward-sloping. With
firm relocation and the FDI-export link, the self-financing rate is 124 %. This means that the
government can save an additional NOK 24 for every NOK 100 given as tax relief. However,
without these channels, the self-financing rate drops to 57 %. These results have important
implications for the interpretation of corporate tax reductions in small open economies. Even
though it may be fiscally beneficial for a small open economy to cut corporate taxes, our results
show that it will still be costly if other countries follow suit, since international firms will then
have no incentive to relocate. Our findings therefore demonstrate the fiscal incentives underlying
international tax competition.
We used the extended model to analyze the tax reform in Norway from 2014 to 2019, where, inter
alia, the corporate tax rate was gradually reduced from 28 % in 2013 to 22 % in 2019. When
first considering unchanged foreign tax rates, we found that the reform, is isolation, increases
investment by about 3.5 % and mainland GDP by about 1.1 %, in the long-run. The self-
financing rate is estimated to be around 129 % when firm relocation and profit shifting is included.
However, when firm relocation is excluded, on the assumption that many other countries have
made corresponding reductions in their corporate income tax, we found that the positive long-
run impact of the tax reform on mainland GDP is reduced to well below 1 %. Moreover, when
both firm relocation and profit shifting are excluded, the self-financing rate drops from 129 % to
73 %.
There are several aspects of how corporate taxes impact economic aggregates that need further
study. In this paper, we have not analyzed welfare effects or the impact on inequality. To
examine welfare effects, a model that also captures the value of leisure and the disutility of work
should be used, possibly also including leisure externalities; see e.g. Pintea (2010). The methods
42
reviewed by Thoresen et al. (2016) could be used to study the distributional impact. We leave
this for future research.
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Sensitivity with respect to interest, tax depreciation and corporate tax rates
We have identified three determinants of the intensive margin response of investment to a cor-
porate tax cut in the analytical section 2.4.2: the (steady-state) market interest rate, the tax
depreciation rate and the pre-reform level of the corporate tax rate. In figure S1 we plot the
long-run increase in investment (as % increase relative to the initial steady state) following a
1 pp corporate tax cut against different values of these three determinants. In the figure we
show not only the intensive margin response as predicted by the analytical, partial equilibrium
model, but also the simulated, general-equilibrium intensive and extensive margin response of
investment. Figure S1a plots the long-run investment response as a function of the steady-state
market interest rate (which we vary by choosing the risk-free rate in our steady-state calibration
accordingly). Figure S1b plots this response as a function of the tax depreciation rate and figure
S1c as a function of the initial level of the corporate tax rate. The vertical line in each graph
represents the steady-state base calibration of the model.
Focusing first on the intensive margin (yellow dashed line with relocation and purple line without
relocation) and the derived partial equilibrium prediction for the intensive margin from section
2.4.2 (green densely dashed line) we observe that the analytical results are qualitatively confirmed
by the full simulation. The effect on intensive-margin investment is larger in a high interest rate
environment, for lower values of the capital depreciation allowance rate and for higher pre-reform
tax rates. In terms of the size of the response, the analytical, partial-equilibrium predictions dif-
fer somewhat from the simulated intensive-margin responses, implying that general equilibrium
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effects matter. These are due to spillover effects from firm location to export demand and the
corresponding positive effects on domestic production.
While the level of the market interest rate does not influence the strength of the extensive
margin response in any significant way (red dotted line), more generous tax depreciation rates
and a lower pre-reform tax level tend to attract more firms for a given tax rate cut. The sensitiv-
ity analysis suggests that, overall, each of the three determinants has a bearing on the aggregate
investment response. The investment response to the market interest rate is significantly lower
at today’s interest rate levels than to the rates of 5 pp and more that predominated prior to 2000.
Tax cuts tend to have a stronger effect on investment when capital depreciation allowances are
less generous. Finally, the investment response is also stronger at lower levels of the corporate
tax rate, implying that large tax cuts have more pronounced effects than simple extrapolation
of a smaller tax cut would suggest.
Thus, while the model predicts that corporate tax cuts generally increase investment, their
effectiveness may vary across countries depending on the generosity of capital depreciation al-
lowance rates and initial corporate tax rate levels, and at different times with differing market
interest rate levels. Our analysis suggests that taking each of the three determinants into account
is important for reaching reliable estimates of corporate tax elasticities.
B Supplementary graphs and tables illustrating the 2014-
2019 tax reform
B.1 Effects from changes in capital income and labor taxation
This supplement includes some figures that were excluded from the main article for the sake of
brevity.
Figure S2 shows the response of the main macroeconomic variables to the reform. Since the
reduction in corporate tax is the main driver of the results, the responses are qualitatively similar
to the transmission channels already discussed in section 4.1. However, since the corporate tax
rate cut in this section is six times larger than the 1 pp tax cut considered before, the responses
across all variables roughly scale by a factor of six. The main difference is that the reform has
an additional effect of a net decrease in labor taxes. Hence, the response of employment to the
reform is somewhat stronger than it is to the corporate tax cut alone.
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Figure S2: Response of further macroeconomic variables to the Norwegian tax reform. Per cent
deviation from baseline unless stated otherwise. Time period 0 corresponds to 2013Q4.
The 2014-2019 tax reform adjusted personal income taxation in three ways. First, the ordinary
income tax rate, which pertains to labor, interest, and dividend income, was cut by an amount
corresponding to a 4.5 percentage point decrease in the effective tax rate. Second, a new scale-up
factor of 1.44 for dividends was introduced such that when the shareholder receives 100 kroner
in taxable dividend, the dividend tax is calculated on the basis of NOK 144 of dividend. Labor
surtaxes were adjusted such that the effective labor surtax increased by 2.3 pp. We can separate
the effect of the dividend tax adjustment from these other adjustments, which mainly pertain to
labor income. Viewed in isolation, dividend tax increased from 28 to 31.68%.
Figures S3 and S4 show the response of key variables to the two fiscal shocks: dividend tax
adjustment and labor tax adjustment. The labor tax adjustment is expansionary, as it leads to a
net decrease in labor taxes which is financed by withdrawals from the oil fund. The lower labor
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tax leads to higher labor force participation and employment. There is an increase in investment
due both to an income effect and to an increase in marginal productivity of capital attributable
to higher employment. In contrast, the dividend tax adjustment is mildly contractionary. In the
ASE tax system of NORA, the increase in dividend tax is equivalent to a lump-sum tax hike.
This negative income effect causes consumption and investment to decline. If the dividend tax
proceeds were redistributed to households in the form of lump-sum transfers, the dividend tax
would be exactly neutral, implying that all responses shown here would be zero.

















































Figure S3: Response of investment and GDP to the Norwegian tax reform. Time period 0
corresponds to 2013Q4.
B.2 Self-financing in the 2014-2019 reform
Table S1 shows the self-financing contributions from different tax bases. The first column shows
the result for the corporate tax cut only and the second column shows the result for the full reform.
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Figure S4: Response of further macroeconomic variables to the Norwegian tax reform. Time
period 0 corresponds to 2013Q4.
They both include the effect of profit-shifting, which contributes about 8 percentage points to
the self-financing of the reform. The third column shows the self-financing contributions when
no relocations are assumed to take place, corresponding to a scenario in which tax rates are
reduced internationally by the same amounts as in Norway so that firms have no tax incentive
for moving.
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Table S1: Financing contributions from each item in the government budget for the 2014-2019 tax reform
Corporate tax only 2014-2019 tax reform No relocation
Income components 202 191 74
Corporate profit tax 22 20 2
Consumption tax 51 49 20
Ordinary income tax 73 64 42
of which labor income 55 41 7
of which interest income 2 7 6
of which dividend income 15 16 30
Labor surtax 17 21 4
Household social security contributions 4 4 1
Firm social security contributions 35 32 5
Expenditure components -73 -56 -0
Government purchases and investment -5 -4 -0
Government employment -66 -58 -7
Unemployment benefits 0 0 0
Government debt servicing -2 6 7
Oil fund withdrawals -29 -35 27
Self-financing rate 129 135 73
Consistent with the table presented in the main text, the financing contribution for budget items Z that are





X), where plus sign applies to expenditure items and
minus sign applies to tax items and where the sum over X includes corporate tax, personal ordinary income tax
excluding dividends, social security contributions of households, labor surtax, and dividend tax. The self-financing






τZend is the final tax rate for the tax Z. Profit-shifting is assumed to contribute to self-financing from corporate
profit tax for the first two columns only.
C Derivation of firm-specific first-order conditions





















where ACt(i) denotes real price adjustment cost for firm i, χ is a parameter determining the mag-





πt is equivalent to
PNomt (i)
PNomt−1 (i)
, implying that adjustment cost operate on the nominal price.
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where χInv is a parameter determining the magnitude of investment adjustment costs. Addi-
tionally, firms face costs when adjusting the level of new borrowing. Preserving the symmetry











We express the problem of firm i (without using the index i unless necessary) from the perspective
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Since all firms arrive at this same optimal pricing equation, we can drop the firm index (i) and
obtain from above



























3. ∂L∂BNt = 0 yields
0 = ∆DIVt (1 + λ
B
































. In the absence of new borrowing adjustment costs
(χBN = 0), it holds that λBt = −1.
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4. ∂L∂Bt = 0 yields








⇔ −λBt (1 + rt+1)πt+1 + λBt+1 = (1− τt+1)(RLt RPBt (1 + ξBbt)− 1)
5. ∂L∂Invt = 0 yields












































































6a. ∂L∂Kt+1 = 0 yields
0 = −∆DIVt λKt + ∆DIVt+1 λKt+1(1− δ)) + ∆DIVt+1 λYt+1αM
Yt+1
Kt+1
⇔ λKt (1 + rt+1) = λKt+1(1− δ) + λYt+1αM
Yt+1
Kt+1
6b. ∂L∂Kτt+1 = 0 yields
































0. Hence, the tax-relevant capital stock has a positive shadow value and is thus beneficial to hold




1+r−(1−δτ )/π > 0.
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We can rewrite the envelope condition on the physical capital stock under the following simpli-
fying assumptions: (i) no investment and price adjustment cost, (ii) constant relative investment
price. We then obtain the expression
λKt (1 + rt+1) = λ
K
t+1(1− δ) + λYt+1αM
Yt+1
Kt+1









λKt (1 + rt+1)− λKt+1(1− δ)
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Following Sandmo (1974) we can interpret the right-hand side of the equation as the user cost
of capital, which equals the marginal product of capital (l.h.s.) in the optimum.52
52In Sandmo (1974) firms are perfectly competitive such that the mark-up term collapses to one.
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D Semi-elasticity of investment to a corporate profit tax cut
Using the steady-state value of the shadow price of the taxable capital stock, see appendix C,
we can express the steady-state price of capital as
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(r + δ)(π + rπ − 1 + δτ ) + τ δτπ (π − δπ − 1 + δτ − π − rπ + 1− δτ )




(r + δ)(π + rπ − 1 + δτ ) + τ δτπ (−δπ − rπ)




(r + δ)(π + rπ − 1 + δτ − τδτ )
π + rπ − 1 + δτ
Note that this cost of capital equation can be rearranged to express it as a function of the net






















π + rπ − 1 + δτ
.
We now derive the derivative of the steady-state user cost of capital with respect to the corporate
53Consider an investment I0 made in period t = 0. In period t = 1, following the tax-stock capital accumulation
in equation (12), the real value of that investment for tax purposes is given by I0/π. From the perspective of
period t = 0, the value of the tax depreciation shield in t = 1 is then given by τδτ I0/π 11+r , where the last term
follows from discounting the future one period ahead. In period t = 2, the initial investment has depreciated at the
tax allowance rate δτ , implying a NPV of the tax depreciation shield (in that period only) of τδτ (1−δτ ) I0π2(1+r)2 .
Overall, summing over all future periods, we obtain a NPV of the tax depreciation shield per unit of investment

















1− δ − (1− δτ )/π











π − δπ − 1 + δτ





(r + δ)(π + rπ − 1 + δτ ) + δτπ (π − δπ − 1 + δτ − π − rπ + 1− δτ )




(r + δ)(π + rπ − 1 + δτ ) + δτπ (−δπ − rπ)




(r + δ)(π + rπ − 1)










π + rπ − 1
π + rπ − 1 + δτ − τδτ
=
π + rπ − 1
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In other words, we assume that only capital adjusts to the tax rate change, while employment
remains constant. Given I = δK in steady state, the semi-elasticity of investment with response



















































E Comparison with Sandmo (1974)
With respect to our setup in section 2, Sandmo (1974) makes two assumptions simplifying the
analysis. First, Sandmo implicitly assumes that the capital stock for tax purposes equals the
physical capital stock at any point in time, despite a higher tax depreciation rate. This ultimately
leads to λK
τ
dropping out of the equation. Second, Sandmo assumes a model without inflation.
We can replicate the expression for the user cost of capital in Sandmo (1974) by imposing
these assumptions on our model. Hence, we drop the constraint on the capital stock for tax
purposes in equation (12) from the model and use the physical capital stock as the basis for the
depreciation allowance in equation (11). Furthermore, we assume, that inflation in the model is
given by π = 1. Deriving the analogous optimality condition as in section 2 under these simplified
conditions yields







(δ − δτ )
]
(23)
which is equivalent to the specification in Sandmo (1974). Note that the sign of the effect of a
tax cut on the cost of capital (and investment) in this specification is ambiguous and depends
on δτ . If the latter is large enough, a corporate tax cut can lead to an increase in the cost of
capital and depress investment.
F Neutrality of the ASE tax system with respect to taxation
of dividends
In this section, we show that the ASE tax system is neutral with respect to dividend taxation. The
following calculations are from the perspective of Norwegian investors. Although foreign investors
pay dividend tax to their home countries, as a rule, the Norwegian distributing company must
deduct 25 percent withholding tax on dividends. The tax rate for foreign investors may however
be reduced in accordance with tax treaties or Norwegian tax regulations, see The Norwegian Tax
Administration.
As derived in Aursland et al. (2019), the real market interest rate rt in NORA is an endogenous
function of the interest rate at household level, financial fees (a trick introduced to model the
equity risk premium in a perfect foresight model), and the dividend taxation rate. Specifically, the
optimal decision with respect to holding stocks at household level yields the following expression:
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rt =
(1 + FSt )r
hh
t − 1/πtτDt (1 +RRAt)
1− τDt
− 1, (24)
where FSt are financial fees paid for holding stock (expressed as a percentage of the stock’s value),
rhht is the household-level real after tax interest rate on deposits introduced below, τDt is total tax
rate on dividends (given by the product of household-level ordinary income tax and the scale-up
factor on shareholder income), and RRAt is risk-free return allowance, also introduced below.
The household-level real after tax interest rate on deposits reflects households’ discounting of








This reflects the fact that NOK 1 invested in risk-free deposits earns interest at a nominal risk-
free interest rate Rt (which is set by the central bank in line with a standard Taylor rule) minus
taxes (nominal interest income is taxed at the household ordinary income tax rate τOIHt ) and
adjusted for inflation.
According to the Norwegian law, the risk-free return allowance is set as the nominal after-tax
risk-free return, i.e.
RRAt = (1− τOIHt )Rt−1
Thus dividends are only taxed on amounts in excess of the after-tax return on risk-free assets.
While equation (24) suggests at first sight that the market interest rate responds to changes in
the level of dividend taxation (and thus to the scale-up factor), it can be shown by inserting the
expressions for rhht and RRAt in (24), that










1−τD is the equity premium. So far we did not say much about the functional
form of the financial fees term. To reproduce the important property that the equity risk premium














Note that we have assumed that the equity premium is independent of the dividend tax, which
54The relation between the equity premium and the corporate tax rate can be easily derived within the stochastic
version of the NORA model. See also the related discussion in Devereux and Freeman (1991).
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is a simplifying assumption that partly captures the reality that not all of those who invest
in Norwegian equities are subject to the Norwegian dividend tax.55 A consequence of this
assumption is that the market interest rate is independent of the dividend tax, in line with the
underlying principle of an allowance for shareholder equity (ASE) in the tax system. Hence,
changing the scale-up factor (i.e. the dividend tax rate) has no effect on the user cost of capital.
G Neutrality of the ACE tax system and non-neutrality of
the ASE tax system with respect to the corporate tax
rate
In the following we show why the user cost of capital is not neutral with respect to the corporate
income tax in the ASE tax system, in contrast to the ACE tax system. In the absence of equity
risk premium, Devereux and Freeman (1991) (see page 12 in their Appendix) derive the user cost




+ δ = rrf + δ, (28)
where the rrf is the risk-free real discount rate (an expression for which can be obtained from
equation (24) by setting RRA = 0 and F = 0), δ is depreciation rate, and τ is corporate tax rate.
Note that we set P I = 1 so the notation is consistent with our main text. In this discussion we,
however, abstract from the details of the tax depreciation shield. The subtraction of rrfτ in the
numerator represents the impact on the user cost from the allowance for corporate equity in the
ACE system. While Devereux and Freeman (1991) derive the equation under the assumption
that there is no equity premium, the derivation works equally well in the presence of equity





where r is the real market interest rate, which includes a risk premium. Substituting the formulas










− 1 + RP
1− τ
+ δ. (30)
The nominal deposit rate, or the risk free-interest rate, R, does not depend on the corporate
tax rate and as discussed in the previous section, RP ∝ (1 − τ) so that PKACE is neutral to the
corporate tax rate.
55When all the investors are domestic and subject to the same dividend taxation, the equity premium that
can be derived from the stochastic model would be proportional to (1 − τD)(1 − τ). In other words, the equity
premium would decrease when dividend tax increases.
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In the ASE tax system the subraction of rrfτ is absent from the required return formula and
the investor’s required return given by equation (26) is different than in a non-ASE tax system.
Hence, dropping −τrrf and substituting r in equation (29) using (26), we obtain
PKASE =
rhh − 1 +RP
1− τ
+ δ. (31)





1 + (1− τOIH)R
)
− 1, (32)










The risk premium RP is again proportional to (1− τ) so that the corresponding part is neutral
to corporate tax. Note that the nominal risk free interest rate R is endogenous and responds to
a change in household ordinary income tax such that R ∝ (1− τOIH)−1, see equation 24. Hence,
the ASE tax system is not neutral to corporate income tax (nor to the combined reduction in
household and corporate income tax). As discussed in the previous section, the ASE tax system
is neutral with respect to dividend tax if and only if RP is independent of the dividend tax.






where rrf again represents the risk-free part of the discount rate obtained from (24) assuming
RRA = 0 and F = 0. After some algebra we can write






















Here the factor (1 − τOIH)R is invariant to tax changes. Hence PK is both non-neutral with
respect to a change in the dividend tax and a simultaneous change in the corporate income tax
and the household ordinary income tax.
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H Government budget balance
Norway does not borrow money to finance government spending. However, the government’s total
revenue from the petroleum industry is transferred to the GPFG. Withdrawals from the fund
are used to cover the structural non-oil fiscal deficit so that the government budget constraint
can be written as
Tt +OFWt = Gt, (37)
where OFWt denotes withdrawals from the GPFG. According to the fiscal rule (Norwegian:
handlingsregelen) a maximum of 3 % of the fund’s value, equivalent to the forecast real return,
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Additional taxes on Labor income and transfers









Dividend and capital gains tax
, (38)











+ UBt(Lt − Et)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Unemployment benefits




t (1 + τ
SSF
t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Government wage bill
. (39)
The tax changes that we consider affect Tt and Gt, so that the budget constraint will not hold
unless we assume adjustment in some other financing instrument. As the means of financing
we consider what Aursland et al. (2020) call oil financing, which corresponds to allowing OFWt
to adjust in the above equation. This comes at no meaningful macroeconomic cost. The oil
financing serves to isolate the effects of the tax cut from the effect of the offsetting fiscal maneuver.
This enables better comparability with empirical results that rely on cross-country differences
in tax rates rather than financed tax reforms. The theoretical literature often assumes transfer
financing. If we use transfer financing, the results will be qualitatively similar. Quantitatively,
the self-financing rates will be higher in the benchmark case and lower in the no-relocation case,
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increasing the wedge between the two scenarios.
I Additional graphs and tables
Figure S5: Exports and inward FDI. The graph shows the linear fit ln(X) =
0.327(0.016) ln(FDI)+5.737(0.136), with standard errors in parentheses, N = 30 and R2 = 0.94.
The projection coefficient estimate for the elasticity of exports with respect to inward FDI stock
is 0.327. Here X denotes real exports of goods and services excluding oil and natural gas (Source:
SSB Table 07336) deflated by the Norwegian consumer price index. FDI denotes real inward
FDI stock (Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report) converted to NOK and deflated by the
Norwegian consumer price index. The estimation period is 1990-2019.
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Table S2: Financing contributions from each item in the government budget when lump-sum
taxes are used for financing
Benchmark No relocation Profit shifting
Ex-ante fiscal impulse 100 100 100
Income components 240 30 270
Corporate profit tax 20 -1 32
Consumption tax 69 0 77
Ordinary income tax 83 31 87
of which labor income 68 1 73
of which interest income 2 1 3
of which dividend income 13 29 12
Labor surtax 21 0 22
Household social security contributions 4 0 5
Firm social security contributions 43 0 46
Expenditure components -90 0 -96
Government purchases and investment -6 0 -6
Government employment -81 -1 -87
Unemployment benefits 0 0 0
Government debt servicing -3 0 -3
Oil fund withdrawals -51 70 -74
Self-financing rate 151 30 174
Following Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), the financing contribution for budget items Z other than cor-
porate tax revenue is calculated as ±∆Z/(TBOIFSS ∆τOIF ), where a plus sign applies to expenditure
items and a minus sign applies to tax items. The self-financing contribution from the corporate tax
base is calculated as 1 + ∆T/(TBOIFSS ∆τOIF ), where TBOIFSS is the corporate tax base (taxable income)
and ∆τOIF is the change in the corporate profit tax rate (1 pp). Benchmark = model with foreign
investment and without profit shifting. No relocation = model without foreign investment and without
profit shifting. Profit shifting = model with foreign investment and with profit shifting.
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